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 Problems and Conclusions 
Russia: A Euro-Pacific Power? 
Goals, Strategies and Perspectives of 
Moscow’s East Asia Policy 
Russia has been working since the mid-2000s to 
expand the hitherto neglected East Asian pillar of 
its foreign relations. In view of the rise of China 
and America’s “pivot to Asia”, Russia risks politically 
marginalisation even as the region becomes increas-
ingly important both globally and for Russia itself. 
If Russia wishes to survive as a major global power, 
it will have to establish a presence in precisely this 
“key region” of the twenty-first century. The East 
Asian nations are increasingly important for the Rus-
sian economy too: trade with them already exceeds 
Russia’s trade volume with the post-Soviet states. Mos-
cow’s new concentration on East Asia is also driven 
by domestic political motives, as its underdeveloped 
eastern regions can only be modernised in coopera-
tion with the East Asian nations. 
Russia’s new East Asia policy is pursuing ambitious 
goals. Seeking to establish itself as a “Euro-Pacific 
power” ultimately means regaining its role as a great 
power in the region. Initial successes are indeed visible, 
but the country also faces major obstacles that will 
prove insurmountable, at least in the medium term. 
Militarily, Russia cannot avoid falling ever further 
behind the United States and China, efforts to mod-
ernise its Eastern Military District notwithstanding. 
In view of its lack of aircraft carriers and foreign bases, 
Moscow’s very limited ability to project power beyond 
its immediate border region curtails its possibilities to 
operate as a stabilising power, especially in South-East 
Asia. 
Politically Moscow is pursuing a dual strategy in 
East Asia. Firstly, it is developing its “strategic partner-
ship” with China. But, secondly it has ceased to rely, as 
it did in the 1990s, solely on Beijing to act as its “door-
opener” in East Asia. As the bilateral balance of power 
has shifted against it, the Kremlin has come to regard 
that approach as counterproductive. China is not pre-
pared to accept Russia as an equal partner in East Asia, 
and willing to grant it at best the role of a junior part-
ner. In order to secure and expand its options, Russia 
is therefore seeking to diversify its political relations 
and to join the most important regional institutions. 
Initial successes have been achieved: participation in 
the East Asia Summit, membership of the Asia-Europe 
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Meeting (ASEM) and closer political relations with 
Vietnam and Japan. Here Russia has profited from the 
changing strategic environment in East Asia, where 
China’s striving for hegemony and jostling with the 
United States give cause for concern to many coun-
tries in the region. But seen overall, Russia’s East Asia 
policy appears in many respects to be more a sum of 
bilateral relations than a coherent regional strategy. 
Another sign of this is that Moscow has yet to develop 
ideas of its own about how to involve the United States 
in its East Asia policy. Until that happens Moscow’s 
diversification will remain incomplete. The deterio-
ration of Russian-Western relations caused by the 
Ukraine crisis places the Kremlin under growing pres-
sure, making it unlikely in the short to medium term 
that Moscow and Washington will develop an “Asian 
perspective” for one another or turn to forward-
looking mutual interests and cooperation opportuni-
ties. The Ukraine crisis has also thrown a spanner into 
the rapprochement with Japan. 
At a more fundamental level, Russia’s East Asia 
policy lacks stable political, societal and economic 
foundations. Bilateral relations remain restricted to 
the highest political level and as such vulnerable 
to political mood-swings. 
The Achilles’ heel of Russia’s East Asia ambitions, 
however, is the economic sphere. Although comple-
mentarities with the East Asian economic space do 
exist, including geographical proximity, transport 
routes to Europe and its wealth of resources, Russia 
has largely failed to leverage these qualitatively for its 
modernisation efforts. While at first glance impres-
sive, the figures for growth in trade cannot hide the 
fact that the import/export structure is consolidating 
to Russia’s disadvantage. In the first place its future 
appears to be as raw material supplier for East Asia. 
Nor has it to date succeeded – even in strategically 
important areas such as energy and arms sales – in 
turning economic cooperation into political influence. 
Russia’s turn to East Asia also raises questions for 
Germany and the European Union, such as the extent 
to which this is associated with a shift away from the 
Kremlin’s traditional fixation on the Euro-Atlantic 
space. When Moscow began expanding its relations 
with East Asia in the second half of the 2000s, the 
move was conceived initially as no more than a sup-
plement to its policy towards Europe and United 
States, in the sense of a long-mooted multi-vectoral 
foreign policy. But now during President Vladimir 
Putin’s third presidential term, Russia’s East Asia 
policy is increasingly presented as an alternative to 
rapidly deteriorating relations with the European 
Union and the United States. But Moscow is quickly 
discovering the limits of this approach. Its political 
and economic position in the east is too weak to suc-
cessfully play an “East Asian card” against Europe. The 
nations of Europe remain the Russian economy’s most 
important modernisation partners. Moreover, any 
turn away from Europe would risk Russia becoming 
sucked into a junior partnership with China. 
In view of the tensions in Russian-Western relations, 
cooperation in relation to East Asia appears out of 
the question for the moment. But in the medium to 
long term the question will arise whether for example 
Russia, the European Union and the United States 
could work together there. Ultimately, on a more 
general level, they certainly share interests in a multi-
lateral containment of growing Chinese power, in 
establishing a functioning regional security system, 
and in peaceful resolution of the North Korea conflict 
and the territorial disputes in the East and South 
China Seas. In order to explore the possibilities for 
practical cooperation in these fields, the political 
dialogue should first be intensified at both the expert 
level and the political. 
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 Russia’s New East Asia Discourse: Backgrounds, Objectives, Roles 
 
Geographically speaking, more of the Russian Federa-
tion is Asian than European. Despite three-quarters of 
its territory lying in Siberia and the Far East, Moscow 
long neglected Asia in its foreign policy thinking and 
actions. Much too dominant was the relationship with 
its own sphere of influence, the post-Soviet space, and 
with the West as the most important modernisation 
partner and central “other” in Russian identity dis-
course. 
Only since the second half of the 2000s has Asia 
moved to the top of Russia’s foreign policy priorities, 
although the 2013 foreign policy concept, like its 
predecessors from 2000 and 2008, names the region 
only fourth place, after CIS, European Union and 
United States.1 But in many other pronouncements 
President Vladimir Putin accords precedence to Asia.2 
Especially in Moscow’s foreign policy activities, a new 
eastward dynamism can be observed since mid-2000s. 
This is reflected in expanded bilateral relations, 
strengthened participation in multilateral regional 
institutions and the expansion of bureaucratic and 
academic resources. For example the Russian foreign 
ministry now has as many departments for Asia as for 
the CIS, while research centres for the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) were set up at Russian 
universities in 2009 and 2010 respectively.3 
In parallel to this, an intense debate on Asia policy 
began in Russia during the second half of the 2000s, 
1  “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation”, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, official 
website, 12 February 2013, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/ 
76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D. 
2  In a programmatic essay shortly before the 2012 presiden-
tial election and a speech to Russian diplomats in July 2012, 
Putin in both cases moved straight from relations with the 
post-Soviet space to the relationship with Asia. Vladimir 
Putin, “Rossiia i menyayushchisiia mir” [Russia and the 
changing world], Moskovskie Novosti, 27 February 2012; “Meet-
ing with Russian Ambassadors and Permanent Representa-
tives in International Organisations”, President of Russia, offi-
cial website, 9 July 2012, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/4145. 
3  An ASEAN Centre was set up at the Moscow State Institute 
of International Relations (MGIMO) in 2009 (http://asean. 
mgimo.ru) and an APEC Centre at the Presidential Academy 
of National Economy and Public Administration in 2010 
(http://www.apec-center.ru). 
and was given another boost by the Russian APEC 
presidency in 2012. But it was conducted less by 
regional scholars than by high-ranking politicians 
such as Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Medvedev and Sergey 
Lavrov and foreign policy experts like Sergey Kara-
ganov, Fyodor Lukyanov, Vyacheslav Nikonov and 
Dmitri Trenin. That is indicative of the fundamental 
character of the debate, in the sense of a realignment 
of Russian foreign policy.4 
The regional focus here is East Asia. The Russian 
Asia debate and policy have traditionally looked above 
all to North-East Asia (China, Japan and the Korean 
Peninsula), which is where both the most important 
trading partners and the biggest security challenges 
are to be found. But since the mid-2000s Moscow 
has also devoted greater attention to South-East Asia, 
meaning the ASEAN states. Growing trade relations 
play a role here, as do multilateral processes within 
and emanating from the sub-region, which Russia uses 
as a gateway for a greater presence in East Asia in gen-
eral. The study acknowledges this prioritisation and 
concentrates on Russian East Asia policy.5 Russia’s 
4  The most important academic and policy advice con-
tributions are: Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia 
Pacific (CSCAP), “Going East: Russia’s Pacific Strategy”, Russia 
in Global Affairs, 25 December 2010, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/ 
number/Going-East-Russias-Asia-Pacific-Strategy-15081; “The 
Year 2010: Was Russia Looking to the East?”, International 
Affairs (Moscow), 57, no. 2 (2011): 168–87; Oleg Barabanov 
and Timofei Bordachev, Toward the Great Ocean, or the New Glob-
alization of Russia (Moscow, July 2012), http://vid-1.rian.ru/ig/ 
valdai/Toward_great_ocean_eng.pdf; Dmitry Trenin, “Euro-
Pacific Nation”, Russia in Global Affairs, 24 March 2003, http:// 
eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_639. The central contributions 
by leading politicians include: Sergey Lavrov, “The Rise of Asia, 
and the Eastern Vector of Russia’s Foreign Policy”, Russia in 
Global Affairs, 2006, no. 3, 68–80; Alexey Borodavkin, “Russia’s 
Eastern Policy: Summing Up and Looking Forward”, Inter-
national Affairs (Moscow) 57, no. 2 (2011): 28–32; Dmitry 
Medvedev, “Russia Must Look East”, Financial Times, 2 Novem-
ber 2012, http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/11/02/guest-
post-by-dmitry-medvedev-russia-must-look-east/#axzz2Iz3gSf00. 
5  As part of the post-Soviet space, Central Asia is bracketed 
out of Russia’s Asia discourse. And although India is an im-
portant “strategic partner” and Afghanistan a crucial security 
factor, South Asia plays only a subsidiary role. 
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Russia’s New East Asia Discourse: Backgrounds, Objectives, Roles 
relationship to the United States, as the region’s most 
important external actor, is also examined. 
The origins of the new debate are to be found in 
two developments. The first of these is the already 
noted leap in the importance of East Asia, both glob-
ally and in relation to Russia. Geopolitically this is 
reflected primarily in the growing power of China and 
in the realignment of US foreign policy under Presi-
dent Obama. As well as asserting its regional power 
ever more confidently and playing a growing global 
role, Beijing it is also able to shift the balance of bi-
lateral relations with Moscow in its favour. For the 
first time in its history Russia is now dealing with an 
eastern neighbour that threatens to become stronger 
than itself – or has already done so. In the words of 
Dmitri Trenin this represents an “earthquake” in 
foreign policy thinking.6 In autumn 2011, Washington 
in turn initiated its “pivot” to Asia, which should be 
understood as an expansion of its political and mili-
tary capabilities and its regional leadership role. Most 
Russian experts and politicians see the altered stra-
tegic circumstances as posing a central challenge for 
their own foreign policy, namely that Moscow could 
become even more politically marginalised in East 
Asia than it is already.7 At the same time the Ukraine 
crisis has increased the importance of East Asia for 
Russian foreign policy. In a context of deteriorating 
relations with the European Union and the United 
States, good relations with key East Asian actors – 
Japan, South Korea and ASEAN as well as China – are 
crucial for the Kremlin to avert any appearance of 
international isolation. 
In the economic sphere Russian politicians and 
experts likewise note the growing importance of 
East Asia. The region is lauded as the “powerhouse 
of growth”8 or “vital center”9 of the world economy. 
6  Dmitri Trenin, “Challenges and Opportunities: Russia and 
the Rise of China and India”, in Strategic Asia 2011–12: Asia 
Responds to Its Rising Powers – China and India, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, 
Travis Tanner and Jessica Keough (Seattle and Washington, 
D.C., 2011), 227–36 (227). 
7  Sergey Karaganov, “Russia’s Asian Strategy”, Russia in Global 
Affairs, 2 July 2011, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/Russias-
Asian-Strategy-15254; “The Year 2010: Was Russia Looking to 
the East?” (see note 4). 
8  Dmitry Medvedev, “Excerpts from Transcript on Meeting of 
the Far East’s Socioeconomic Development and Cooperation 
with Asia-Pacific Region Countries”, President of Russia, offi-
cial website, 2 July 2010, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/547. 
9  Sergey Lavrov, “Towards Peace, Stability and Sustainable 
Economic Development in the Asia Pacific Region”, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, official website, 
In the longer term economic power is expected to 
shift away from the traditional growth engines of the 
United States and Europe, which have been lastingly 
weakened by the economic and financial crisis, gravi-
tating instead to the growing economies in the east.10 
The East Asian nations have become increasingly im-
portant for Russia since about 2000, and their share of 
Russian foreign trade now in fact exceeds that of the 
post-Soviet states. Economically, too, the Ukraine crisis 
increases East Asia’s weight, with the threat of Euro-
pean and US economic sanctions spurring Moscow to 
intensify its search for economic alternatives to the 
east. 
Secondly, the new Russian focus on East Asia is 
motivated by domestic pressures. The Kremlin views 
the situation in its own eastern territories – Siberia 
and the Far East – with rising concern.11 Socio-eco-
nomic and security problems such as depopulation, 
high unemployment, low productivity and great 
dependency on raw material exports intertwine in a 
specific manner here. And the economic orientation 
of the eastern regions has changed since the Soviet 
era. These days they look less to European Russia than 
to their East Asian neighbours. Therein lies an oppor-
tunity, but also a risk. Either there will be a “dual 
integration”, in the sense of Russia’s eastern regions 
successfully modernising through integration with 
the East Asian economic space and thus becoming an 
additional resource for a successful Asia policy. But it 
is also possible that Siberia and the Far East will col-
lapse to become a “double periphery”, leaving these 
regions functioning as nothing more than raw ma-
terial suppliers for East Asia and economically (and in 
future potentially politically) decoupled from the rest 
of the country.12 
Many participants in the Russian East Asia discourse 
criticise Moscow’s failure to develop any coherent 
policy to address the region’s increasing weight. They 
demand that better use be made of this neglected 
5 October 2013, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/D19A0531 
B380362544257BFB00259B9E. 
10  “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation” 
(see note 1); “Meeting with Russian Ambassadors and Per-
manent Representatives in International Organisations” (see 
note 2). 
11  “State Council Presidium Meeting”, President of Russia, 
official website, 29 November 2012, http://eng.kremlin.ru/ 
news/4680. 
12  Natasha Kuhrt, “The Russian Far East in Russia’s Asia 
Policy: Dual Integration or Double Periphery?” Europe-Asia 
Studies 64, no. 3 (2012): 471–93. 
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“reserve”13 of foreign policy and call for a strategy to 
secure Russia a “worthy place” in East Asia, as Foreign 
Minister Sergey Lavrov put it.14 
Out of the statements of experts and politicians 
involved in the discourse, it is possible to filter out 
fundamental objectives. The minimum objective is to 
prevent any further erosion and marginalisation of 
Russian power in East Asia, as this could lead to a loss 
of autonomy, for example through being forced into a 
“junior partnership” with China. The maximum goal 
discussed is a significant strengthening of the Russian 
position in the region, in economic, political and mili-
tary terms.15 In fact a new moniker has been coined to 
describe this: Russia should establish itself as a “Euro-
Pacific power”.16 
Although the term is heard only in expert circles, 
it also highlights the Kremlin’s regional ambitions. 
Unlike the post-Soviet space, the issue in East Asia is 
not regional dominance. Historically Moscow has 
never possessed a firm sphere of influence there and 
today it certainly lacks the material and immaterial 
wherewithal to justify any such claim. What Russia’s 
leaders do strive for, however, is a position as an in-
dependent pole in a multi-polar regional system, as an 
equal with the other major powers of East Asia.17 Here 
models and structures from the international level are 
transposed to the East Asian region. At the same time 
it is hoped that a better position in East Asia will re-
13  “Russian-Chinese Section of the Valdai Club Discussed 
Russia’s Strategy in Asia”, 4 December 2011, http://valdaiclub. 
com/event/33780.html. 
14  Medvedev, “Excerpts from Transcript of Meeting” 
(see note 8). 
15  “The Year 2010: Was Russia Looking to the East?” (see 
note 4); “Meeting with Russian Ambassadors and Permanent 
Representatives in International Organisations” (see note 2). 
16  Dmitri Trenin first spoke of Russia as a “Euro-Pacific 
nation” in 2003. The term was adopted in the second half of 
the 2000s by experts close to the Kremlin, who united it with 
the concept of “power”. This anchored the term “Euro-Pacific 
power” in Russia’s Asia discourse as a vision for its role in 
East Asia. Trenin, “Euro-Pacific Nation” (see note 4). 
17  Foreign Minister Lavrov emphasises that Russia seeks a 
“truly stable balance of power” in the Asia-Pacific region and 
must expand its role as a “important stabilizing factor” in the 
region. Lavrov, “Towards Peace, Stability and Sustainable Eco-
nomic Development in the Asia Pacific Region” (see note 9); 
The Russian Embassy in Canada, “The Interview of Russian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov ‘Russia Will Become 
a Stabilizing Factor in the Asia-Pacific Region’”, press release, 
6 February 2012, http://www.rusembassy.ca/ru/node/656. 
Paradorn Rangsimaporn, “Russian Perceptions and Policies in 
a Multipolar East Asia under Yeltsin and Putin”, International 
Relations of the Asia-Pacific 9, no. 2 (2009): 207–44. 
inforce Russia’s claim to be a major global power. It 
is taken for granted that Moscow will only be able to 
maintain that status if it can establish itself as a deci-
sive actor in what is seen as the key region of the 
twenty-first century, the Asia-Pacific.18 This means that 
Moscow’s East Asia policy is not only about pursuing 
concrete political, economic (and security) interests 
affecting the region, but also the superordinate objec-
tives of international status and influence. 
To what extent is Moscow in a position to realise 
its ambitions? What capabilities does it possess, what 
strategies and instruments does it apply? Where have 
successes been observed and what factors hinder im-
plementation? In order to answer these questions, in 
the following Russian East Asia policy is analysed in 
three dimensions: the military, the political and the 
economic. The criteria of the great power role are the 
yardstick. To what degree can Russia fulfil this in East 
Asia? A great military power is characterised not only 
by the capacity to repel dangers and threats on its 
own, but also to project power at a regional scale. 
Politically great powers exert decisive influence in all 
the central questions affecting the region, either de 
facto or through membership of regional institutions. 
They are capable of influencing the regional order 
and the interactions of other states, and their status 
is acknowledged by the other actors. Finally, as far as 
the field of the economy is concerned, great powers 
account for a significant share of the foreign trade of 
the other countries in their region and are in a posi-
tion to exert decisive influence on economic relations 
and regional economic processes.19 
 
 
18  Paradorn Rangsimaporn, Russia as an Aspiring Great Power 
in East Asia: Perceptions and Policies from Yeltsin to Putin (Basing-
stoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
19  These criteria represent the outcome of a synthesis pre-
pared by the author on the basis of the research literature on 
great and regional powers. While Russia does not fit into the 
category of (regional) “emerging powers”, studies on great 
powers often concentrate too strongly on the global level and 
lack detail on how they operate in regional contexts. Kenneth 
N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison 
Wesley, 1979); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics (New York: Norton, 2001); Daniel Flemes, Dirk Nabers 
and Detlef Nolte, eds., Macht, Führung und Regionale Ordnung: 
Theorien und Forschungsperspektiven (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012); 
Detlef Nolte, “How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical 
Concepts and Research Topics”, Review of International Studies 
36, no. 4 (2010): 881–901. 
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 The Military Dimension: Threat Perceptions and Capabilities 
 
Military power continues to play a central role in Mos-
cow’s strategic thinking. It serves not only to defend 
against military threats and dangers, but to some ex-
tent also to compensate the shrinking economic and 
political foundations of the claim to regional and 
global power.20 What threats does Moscow see itself 
exposed to in East Asia? Are its military capabilities 
adequate to the dual challenges of protecting its 
eastern territories and expanding Russia’s influence 
in East Asia? 
With respect to potential risks, the Russian Military 
Doctrine of February 2010 distinguishes between less 
grave “military dangers”, which may lead to “military 
threats” involving a real possibility of armed con-
flict.21 Older official risk and threat analyses devoted 
little space to developments in East Asia. Traditionally 
their focus was directed towards Western actors, first 
and foremost NATO and the United States, and to 
conflicts in the post-Soviet space. But since the end of 
the 2000s, East Asia’s generally heightened signifi-
cance for Moscow accompanied by shifting power 
relations and heightened conflict potential have 
found the region featuring increasingly frequently in 
Russia’s security discourse.22 
Moscow’s perception of risk and threat concen-
trates on North-East Asia and sees no exposure to 
direct military dangers in South-East Asia, where Rus-
sia is not immediately entangled in conflicts such as 
the territorial disputes in the South China Sea (even 
if repercussions such as Chinese military expansion 
have disadvantageous effects for Moscow). 
20  Vladimir Putin, “Being Strong: Why Russia Needs to 
Rebuild Its Military”, Foreign Policy, 21 February 2012, http:// 
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/21/being_strong# 
sthash.h8RFUqST.dpbs. 
21  “Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii” [Military Doc-
trine of the Russian Federation], Sovet Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii [Security Council of the Russian Federation], offi-
cial website, 5 February 2010, http://www.scrf.gov.ru/ 
documents/18/33.html. 
22  “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation” 
(see note 1); “Meeting with Russian Ambassadors and Per-
manent Representatives in International Organisations” (see 
note 2). 
The Unresolved Kuril Conflict 
Security risks principally affect Russia’s North-East 
Asian neighbourhood. The relationship with Japan 
is to this day burdened by an unresolved dispute 
over the five southern Kuril Islands, which Moscow 
annexed at the end of the Second World War. This is 
also the reason why the two sides have never signed 
a peace treaty. Although the Military Doctrine of 
2010 classifies “territorial claims” against Russia as a 
“military danger”,23 nobody in Moscow’s political or 
military leadership actually fears a military invasion 
of the Kuril Islands by Tokyo or therefore sees Japan as 
a genuine “military threat”. The Japanese constitution 
restricts its armed forces to self-defence, their troop 
strength is only one quarter of the Russian, and pri-
marily oriented against China. Nonetheless, Russia 
has been expanding its military presence in the Kuril 
Islands since 2011, and increasingly conducting shows 
of force against Japan. These include major exercises 
in the Sea of Okhotsk (September 2011) and on the 
Kuril Islands (February 2013, August 2014), the pen-
etration of Japanese airspace by strategic bombers, 
and the establishment of additional military facilities 
on the Kuril Islands.24 The show of military muscle 
23  “Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii” (see note 21). 
24  In February 2011 President Medvedev ordered “the 
modern weaponry required for guaranteeing the security of 
the islands” to be deployed to the southern Kurils. By 2015 
two new garrisons are to be built and equipped with modern 
naval and air defence systems. Two of the cited manoeuvres 
coincided with significant historical anniversaries: the Soviet 
victory over Japan in the Second World War and the Japanese 
Northern Territories Day. The military exercise in August 
2014 is an obvious attempt to dissuade Japan from stepping 
up its sanctions in the light of Ukraine crisis. Russia’s sym-
bolic demonstrations of military strength also include visits 
to the Kurils by high-ranking generals, and in February 2012 
the first by a defence minister. Shinji Hyodo, “Russia’s Stra-
tegic Approach towards Asia”, in Neighbourhood Watch: Japanese 
and Swedish Perspectives on Russian Security, ed. Shinji Hyodo and 
Carolina Vendil Pallin (Stockholm, 2012), 28f.; Robert Bridge, 
“Russia to Beef up Military Presence on Contested Kuril 
Islands”, Russia Today, 11 May 2011, http://rt.com/politics/ 
russia-japan-kurils-military-modernization; “Russia to Build 
150 Military Facilities on Kurile Islands”, RIA Novosti, 18 April 
2014, http://en.ria.ru/russia/20140418/189255401/Russia-to-
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appears to be motivated less by any Russian need 
to strengthen it ability to defend the Kuril Islands, 
but instead directed towards wringing political and 
military concessions from Tokyo. In view of its eco-
nomic and in some respects political weakness, a mili-
tary show of strength is one of the few instruments 
alternatives available to Moscow to strengthen its 
hand against Japan. As well as underlining Moscow’s 
negotiating position in the talks on the Kuril question, 
which resumed in 2013, it is also about ratcheting up 
pressure on Tokyo after Japan announced a deepening 
of the Japanese-American security alliance and plans 
to deploy missile radar systems. 
North Korea’s Nuclear and 
Missile Programme 
The Russian leadership worries more about North 
Korea. Its Military Doctrine warns of two “military 
dangers”, namely “proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction” and military escalation.25 Although 
Pyongyang’s nuclear programme is not viewed as 
directed against Russia, geographical proximity (Vla-
divostok is only 150 kilometres from North Korea) and 
seventeen kilometres of shared border give Russia 
good grounds for concern. The threats are not only 
stray missiles but also the possibility of war or politi-
cal implosion leading to loss of control over the nu-
clear weapons and large-scale refugee movements.26 
In order to protect against such risks, Russia is 
stepping up preventive measures, expanding border 
security, holding exercises on preventing illegal 
immigration and modernising its strategic air 
defences. The first battalion of the latest S-400 surface-
Build-150-Military-Facilities-on-Kuril-Islands.html; “Russia 
Says Begins Military Exercises in Pacific Islands Also Claimed 
by Japan”, Reuters, 12 August 2014, http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2014/08/12/us-russia-japan-kuril-idUSKBN0GC0O02014 
0812. 
25  “Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii” (see note 21). 
26  North Korea’s first underground nuclear test in October 
2006 was conducted just 150 kilometres from the Russian 
border. That same year a North Korean Taepodong-2 missile 
crashed into the sea off Nakhodka, inside the Russian exclu-
sive economic zone. Leszek Buszynski, “Russia and North 
Korea: Dilemmas and Interests”, Asian Survey 49, no. 5 (2009): 
809–30 (822); Michael Ludwig, “Moskau fürchtet strategische 
Gewinne für Amerika”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11 April 
2013, 2. 
to-air missile launchers was deployed to Nakhodka, 
just 210 kilometres from the North Korean border.27 
“Unnamed Danger” China 
Relations with China are absolutely fundamental both 
to Russia’s security and to its position in East Asia. Rus-
sian perceptions of its mighty neighbour to the east 
are contradictory. On one hand, the fear of direct mili-
tary threat that shaped Moscow’s relationship with 
Beijing from the 1960s has given way to a normalisa-
tion of bilateral relations initiated by Mikhail Gorba-
chev in 1989. Since then both sides have succeeded in 
building confidence and defusing some of the tradi-
tional conflicts and sources of military risk. Thus in 
1994 they agreed on the demarcation of the 55-kilo-
metre western border and in 2008 the same for the 
4195-kilometre eastern section. 
On the other hand, China’s ever-growing military 
capabilities are viewed with concern. While Russian 
experts agreed until the mid-2000s that the People’s 
Liberation Army was incapable of successful opera-
tions against Russia, this has now come to be regarded 
as only a matter of time.28 The Chinese have massively 
expanded their arsenal in recent years, and already 
possess more operational warships, tanks and war-
planes than the Russians. Moreover, China is modern-
ising its military structures and weapons systems and 
expanding its ability to project power. Although the 
Chinese defence industry still lags technologically in 
certain fields, such as jet engines, ship turbines and 
naval weaponry, it has made a great leap forwards 
over the past ten decade.29 Russia’s military-industrial 
complex, on the other hand, is still relying on develop-
ments dating back to the Soviet era, with little pros-
pect of making up the lost ground. In the medium 
27  Following North Korea’s second atom bomb test in 2009, 
Russia deployed a bataillon of S-400s to its Far East. Chief of 
the General Staff Nikolai Makarov justified this explicitly in 
terms of protecting Russian territory from stray North Korean 
missiles. “Russia Deploys S-400 Air Defense Systems in Far 
East”, RIA Novosti, 26 August 2009, http://en.rian.ru/military_ 
news/20090826/155930246.html. 
28  V. L. Sedelnikov, “China’s Military-Economic Strategy and 
Its Armed Forces Restructuring”, Military Thought, 1 July 2007; 
Alexander Khramchikhin, “Millioni soldat plius sovremennoe 
vooruzhenie” [Millions of soldiers plus modern weaponry], 
Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, 9 October 2009. 
29  Mikhail Barabanov, Vasiliy Kashin and Konstantin Makien-
ko, Shooting Star: China’s Military Machine in the 21st Century (Min-
neapolis: East View, 2012). 
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term Russia therefore finds itself facing a quantitative-
ly and qualitatively equal neighbour on its eastern 
border (and quite possibly one day more powerful). 
China’s possible intentions also arouse suspicion 
in the Kremlin. Moscow naturally understands that 
Beijing’s military expansion is directed primarily 
against the United States rather than Russia, and that 
it is supposed to serve the ends of Chinese hegemony 
in the East and South China Seas. But in the medium 
to long term a militarily stronger China could be 
tempted to adopt a more assertive stance in disputes 
with Russia. Russia’s Far Eastern regions are a tra-
ditional source of potential conflict. In the 1990s 
nationalist currents and regional politicians warned 
of the danger of a “colonialization” of these territories 
through massive illegal immigration from China,30 
pointing to the demographic imbalance along the 
Russian-Chinese border, where fewer than seven mil-
lion Russians face 120 million Chinese. Although fears 
of mass immigration have proved misplaced, worries 
about Chinese predominance in the border region 
continue unabated. Now they are directed towards a 
different issue, namely that a strengthened China 
could be tempted to challenge the current accepted 
border in order to gain access to energy resources 
in the Russian Far East. Russia is well aware that the 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century treaties recognis-
ing its eastern expansion are described as “unjust” in 
Chinese school textbooks.31 Fears were exacerbated in 
2006 and 2009 by major People’s Liberation Army land 
manoeuvres in military districts adjoining Russia.32 
These experiences have found their way into the Mili-
tary Doctrine, which now classes “exercises with pro-
vocative objectives in Russia’s neighbourhood” as a 
“military threat”.33 For some years Russian-Chinese 
30  Mikhail Alexseev, Parting with “Asian Balkans”: Perceptions 
of Chinese Migration in the Russian Far East, 2000–2013, PONARS 
Eurasia Policy Memo 319/2014 (Washington D.C.: Program on 
New Approaches to Russian Security, 2014); Sören Urbansky, 
“Ebbe statt Sturmflut: Chinesen in Russlands Fernem Osten”, 
Osteuropa 62, no. 3 (2012): 21–40. 
31  Andrei Piontkovsky, “China’s Threat to Russia”, Project 
Syndicate, 24 August 2007, http://www.project-syndicate.org/ 
print/china-s-threat-to-russia; Dong Wang, China’s Unequal 
Treaties. Narrating National History, Oxford 2005. 
32  “Stride-2009” was the largest Chinese military exercise 
to date at the time. It was seen particularly clearly as testing 
offensive capabilities against Russia, as it involved a rapid 
northern mobilisation and long-distance deployments. Marcel 
de Haas, Russian-Chinese Security Relations: Moscow’s Threat from 
the East? Clingendael Report 3/2013 (The Hague: Clingendael 
Institute, 2013), 22f. 
33  “Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii” (see note 21). 
conflict potential outside East Asia has also been 
growing. Beijing is undermining Moscow’s hegemony 
in Central Asia, while China’s military-backed Arctic 
ambitions provoke increasing nervousness in the 
neighbouring Russia.34 
As far as Russian security assessments of East Asian 
countries are concerned, China’s is the most ambiva-
lent. Threat perceptions are particularly strong among 
parts of the liberal and nationalist opposition, and 
weakest in the business elite.35 In the armed forces 
Beijing is valued as “strategic partner” and counter-
weight to the United States, but the large-scale Chinese 
exercises of 2009 in particular led high-ranking gen-
erals to speak unusually openly about a potential 
threat from the east.36 Moscow’s political leadership, 
on the other hand, observes restraint on China’s mili-
tary capabilities and intentions, proclaiming instead 
“an unprecedented level of trust and cooperation”37 
and claiming that the idea of a Chinese threat was 
Western mischief-making. One reason for such caution 
is that concerns over security coexist with strong 
interests in political and economic cooperation. Fur-
thermore, any “new” fear of China is still overlain by 
the “old” fear of NATO and the United States. How 
openly Russia responds to military risks emanating 
from Beijing therefore depends in no small part on 
the state of relations with the West. When these are 
relatively relaxed, as was the case during the Russian-
American “reset” of 2009/2010, open criticism of China 
34  Moscow fears that Chinese vessels heading for the Arctic 
could cut through the Sea of Okhotsk, which it regards as 
Russian territorial waters, and that Beijing could develop the 
ability to avoid the Russian-controlled Northern Sea Route. 
The Russian military was put on full alert in summer 2012 
when a Chinese ice-breaker passed through the Sea of Okhotsk 
for the first time and continued on a course to the north of 
the Northern Sea Route, and again one year later when the 
first Chinese warships entered the Sea of Okhotsk. One sign 
of the dimensions of the irritation is that Russian simultane-
ously held military exercises in the east. National Institute 
for Defense Studies, ed., East Asian Strategic Review 2013 (Tokyo, 
2013), 273ff. 
35  Marcin Kaczmarski, The Bear Watches the Dragon: The Russian 
Debate on China (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, 2013). 
36  When asked what war scenario Russia’s army might be 
preparing for, Lieutenant-General Sergey Skokov, Chief of 
the Main Staff, replied that in the east this could be “multi-
million-man army”. Quoted from Simon Saradzhyan, “The 
Role of China in Russia’s Military Thinking”, Russian Analytical 
Digest, no. 78 (4 May 2010): 5–7 (6). 
37  “News Conference of Vladimir Putin”, President of Russia, 
official website, 20 December 2012, http://eng.kremlin.ru/ 
transcripts/4779. 
SWP Berlin 
Russia: A Euro-Pacific Power? 
September 2014 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
The Military Dimension: Threat Perceptions and Capabilities 
and demonstrations of military might are more like-
ly. Russia’s largest eastern military exercise to date, 
Vostok 2010, was held precisely during this period. 
But if relations with the United States and NATO are 
as tense as they have been since 2011, military risks 
in the east tend to be downplayed and security co-
operation with Beijing is expanded. A series of Rus-
sian-Chinese naval manoeuvres began in April 2012 
and have been repeated every year since (July 2013, 
May 2014), and in January 2013 Moscow and Beijing 
announced closer coordination of their responses to 
US missile defence plans.38 Both these factors, interest 
in political/economic cooperation and dependency on 
the Russian-American relationship, make it difficult 
to formulate a coherent security strategy towards East 
Asia in general and China in particular. 
Towards Beijing Moscow pursues a mixture of en-
gagement and balancing, described in the literature 
as “hedging”.39 The uppermost objective is to avoid 
a situation where conflicts escalate into direct con-
frontation. The cooperation mechanisms include 
confidence-building and military-political dialogue, 
cooperation between the armed forces and defence 
industry cooperation. During the 1990s Moscow and 
Beijing already agreed a series of confidence- and secu-
rity-building measures, for example demilitarising 
the border region and renouncing the nuclear first 
strike.40 In the friendship treaty of 2001 they agreed to 
avoid alliances and activities that would violate the 
other’s security, sovereignty or territorial integrity.41 
38  Richard Weitz, “Assessing the Sino-Russian Naval Exercise 
‘Maritime Cooperation 2012’”, Second Line of Defense, http:// 
www.sld info.com/assessing-the-sino-russian-naval-exercise-
%E2%80%9Cmaritime-cooperation-2012%E2%80%9D/; “Russia, 
China Plan to Boost Cooperation on Missile Defense”, RIA 
Novosti, 9 January 2013, http://en.ria.ru/military_news/ 
20130109/178663401/Russia_China_Plan_to_Boost_ 
Cooperation.html; “Russian Battleships in Shanghai for Joint 
Naval Drills”, Russia Today, 19 May 2014, http://rt.com/news/ 
159912-russia-china-naval-drills/. 
39  Evelyn Goh, Understanding “Hedging” in Asia-Pacific Security, 
Pacific Forum CSIS – PacNet 43 (Honolulu, 31 August 2006), 
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/pac0643.pdf. 
40  Jing-dong Yuan, Sino-Russian Confidence Building Measures: 
A Preliminary Analysis (Vancouver, 1998). 
41  “Dogovor o dobrososedstve, druzhbe i sotrudnichestve 
mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federacii i Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubli-
koi” [Treaty on good neighbourhood, friendship and co-
operation between the Russian Federation and the People’s 
Republic of China], Foreign Ministry of the Russian Feder-
ation, official website (Russian), 16 July 2001, http://www. 
mid.ru/bdomp/spd_md.nsf/0/15533E8A2D37C49044257 
D090027757B. 
The political/military dialogue includes strategic 
consultations, for which representatives of the two 
general staffs have met regularly since 1997, while the 
first foreign trip by the new Russian Defence Minister 
Sergei Shoigu in November 2011 took him to Beijing. 
China and Russia began conducting joint military 
manoeuvres in 2005. These are both bilateral and multi-
lateral in the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO), and have been expanded since the 
US “pivot” and the deterioration of Russian-American 
relations. Since 2011 Moscow and Beijing have also 
revitalised their defence industry cooperation, which 
had largely fallen into abeyance after 2006. 
But the Russian leadership does not regard these 
intensified ties as adequate to guarantee its own secu-
rity in the face of China’s military rise. So in parallel 
Moscow is increasingly moving towards indirect 
balancing: activities and mechanisms that are not 
openly directed against the other state, as is the case 
with military alliances (external balancing) or an arms 
race (internal balancing), but which do offer a degree 
of military fall-back in the event of the bilateral rela-
tionship souring.42 Moscow is consequently modernis-
ing its strategic nuclear arsenal especially in the east 
of the country and rejects any reduction in its tacti-
cal nuclear weapons. One important reason for this 
could be the growing conventional imbalance vis-à-vis 
China.43 After all, under Moscow’s Military Doctrine of 
2010 nuclear weapons serve to deter not only nuclear 
attack but also large-scale conventional assault. Certain 
aspects of the military build-up in Russia’s east can 
also be interpreted as insurance against Beijing. The 
reinforcement of strategic air defences in Eastern 
Siberia and the Russian Far East, for example, serves 
to protect the otherwise weakly guarded border with 
China in addition to its foremost purpose of intercept-
ing North Korean and American aircraft and missiles. 
And China is the only logic for maintaining a capacity 
for major ground operations in the east of the coun-
try. Most of the army brigades, reserve units and artil-
lery weapons are deployed in the Eastern Military Dis-
trict where (alongside the Southern District) reequip-
ping with modern weapons is proceeding most rapid-
42  Goh, Understanding “Hedging” (see note 39). 
43  Moscow also ensures it maintains its nuclear lead over 
China. In June 2012 President Putin demanded that future 
disarmament steps must also include the arsenals of “other 
nuclear powers”. Quoted from Richard Weitz, “Can Moscow 
and Washington Join Hands in the Pacific?” The Diplomat, 3 
October 2012, http://thediplomat.com/2012/10/can-russia-and-
the-u-s-come-together-over-asia/. 
SWP-Berlin 
Russia: A Euro-Pacific Power? 
September 2014 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
The US Military “Pivot” 
ly.44 Beyond that, the growing frequency of military 
exercises in the east must be understood, despite 
insistences to the contrary, as a show of strength not 
only against the United States and Japan, but also 
China. The two largest manoeuvres to date, Vostok 
2010 and an unannounced major exercise reportedly 
involving up to 160,000 soldiers in July 2013, took 
place in the Asian part of Russia and included sce-
narios that could only relate to China.45 
Moscow is also insuring against the risk of future 
deterioration in relations with China by placing quali-
tative restrictions on arms sales and refusing to supply 
the most modern systems. This is plainly driven by 
security concerns, given that Moscow demonstrates 
no such qualms about India.46 But the balancing act 
between economic and security interests in defence 
industry cooperation with Beijing is likely to grow 
increasingly difficult as China’s technological capac-
ities grow. In order to maintain a presence in the 
Chinese defence market Russia must supply the latest 
weapons systems. Its willingness to do so appears to 
correlate with the state of Russian-American relations. 
Whereas Russia held back during the “reset” with 
the United States, it has since 2011 been willing for 
example to negotiate over sales of the most up-to-date 
multi-role (Sukhoi Su-35). This gives an indication of 
how dependent on economic and political interests – 
and thus fragile – Russia’ hedging strategy towards 
China is. 
44  Yoshiaki Sakaguchi, “Russia’s Military Reform and Changes 
in the Russian Military in the Russian Far East”, in Neighbour-
hood Watch: Japanese and Swedish Perspectives on Russian Security, 
ed. Shinji Hyodo and Carolina Vendil Pallin (Stockholm, 
2012), (see note 24), 45–55 (49ff.); Vassily Kashin, “The Sum 
Total of All Fears: The Chinese Threat Factor in Russian 
Politics”, Russia in Global Affairs, 15 April 2013, http://eng. 
globalaffairs.ru/number/The-Sum-Total-of-All-Fears-15935. 
45  Vostok 2010 tested a broad spectrum of scenarios includ-
ing counter-terrorism and anti-piracy, handling refugee 
movements in the North Korean border region, repelling a 
hostile landing on the Kurils, moving warplanes from west to 
east, major air-ground operations in Sibiria, and the deploy-
ment of nuclear-capable Tochka short-range ballistic missiles. 
The naval component of the major exercise in 2013 appears 
to have been directed against Japan, the land component 
against China. Jacob W. Kipp, “Vostok 2010 and the Very 
Curious Hypothetical Opponent”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 7, 
no. 133 (12 July 2010); Roger McDermott, “Russia’s Military 
Response to the Asia Pivot: Flexing Small Muscles”, Eurasia 
Daily Monitor 10, 135 (23 July 2013); Zachary Keck, “Russia 
Holds Massive Military Drill Aimed at China, Japan”, The 
Diplomat, 17 July 2013. 
46  Mikhail Barabanov, “China’s Military Modernization: 
The Russian Factor”, Moscow Defense Brief 18, no. 4 (2009): 2–5. 
The US Military “Pivot” 
Russian perceptions towards the strongest military 
power in East Asia, the United States, are equally am-
bivalent. On the one hand, the region has seen very 
little in the way of Russian-American rivalry or earnest 
bilateral conflict since the end of the Cold War. The 
military dangers and threats named in connection 
with Washington in the Military Doctrine of 2010 
concentrate on the global level and the Euro-Atlantic 
space. The Kremlin is also well aware that the expan-
sion of US military power in connection with the 
“pivot” is directed primarily not against Moscow, but 
towards containment of Beijing and Pyongyang. 
On the other hand, the growth in Washington’s 
military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region and the 
associated shift in the balance of forces to Moscow’s 
disadvantage are registered with disquiet.47 By 2020 
the United States plans to increase the proportion of 
its Navy stationed in the region from 50 to 60 percent, 
increase the power projection capacities of the US 
forces, upgrade traditional alliances with countries 
like Japan and South Korea, and forge new partner-
ships for example with Vietnam.48 Washington’s plans 
to strengthen the Asian pillar of its strategic missile 
defence system are viewed especially critically.49 
Unlike Beijing, Moscow relays its security concerns 
openly to Washington. One reason for this is that the 
image of a hostile, dominance-seeking United States 
remains firmly anchored among large parts of the 
Russian elites and is, moreover, regularly revitalised 
and instrumentalised by the Kremlin. Secondly, the 
moderating factor of economic interdependence is 
47  In May 2013 the Secretary of the Security Council of the 
Russian Federation, Nikolai Patrushev, protested against the 
American military build-up in North-East Asia: “Appearance 
of Nuclear Arms in South of Korean Peninsula Unacceptable 
for Russia – Patrushev”, Voice of Russia, 29 May 2013, http:// 
voiceofrussia.com/2013_05_29/Appearance-of-nuclear-arms- 
in-in-south-of-Korean-peninsula-unacceptable-for-Russia-
Patrushev-8146/. 
48  “Remarks by Secretary Panetta at the Shangri-La Dialogue 
in Singapore”, U.S. Department of Defense, official website, 
2 June 2012, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript. 
aspx?transcriptid=5049. 
49  Deputy Defence Minister Anatoly Antonov warned in June 
2013 that US missile defence plans would lead to a “polari-
zation of forces” in East Asia. “Speech by Deputy Minister 
of Defense of the Russian Federation Anatoly Antonov at the 
IISS Asia Security Summit Shangri-La Dialogue”, Ministry of 
Defence of the Russian Federation, official website, 1 June 
2013, http://eng.mil.ru/en/science/publications/more.htm? 
id=11764201@cmsArticle. 
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much weaker in the Russian-American relationship, 
leading to an asymmetry of perceptions. Whereas the 
Russian leadership concentrates above all on the eco-
nomic opportunities in the relationship with China 
and downplays security risks, it sees the United States 
primarily through the lens of security risk and global 
rivalry. This bias also hinders the preparation of a 
coherent security strategy towards East Asia. 
It is for these reasons that Russia neglects the op-
portunities that cooperation with the United States 
could open up in East Asia. As a result indirect bal-
ancing activities also dominate Moscow’s East Asian 
hedging strategy towards Washington, whose essence 
is military cooperation with Beijing. By comparison, 
cooperation instruments are weak in the relationship 
with Washington. Although Russia and the United 
States are connected at the global level and in the 
Euro-Atlantic space by a series of security regimes and 
confidence-building measures, in relation to East Asia 
the lack of agreements on military transparency 
mitigates against trust and confidence. Cooperation 
between the Russia and American armed forces in East 
Asia, moreover, occurs only on an ad hoc basis, and 
not regularly as with China. So although the Russian 
Pacific Fleet participated in the biennial US-led RIMPAC 
exercise for the first time in summer 2012, that has 
remained a one-off event. Moscow did not join RIMPAC 
2014.50 For the moment, the Ukraine crisis is likely to 
have put a stop to these cautious feelers for ad hoc 
military cooperation between Moscow and Washing-
ton. In response to the Kremlin’s actions concerning 
Ukraine, Washington suspended all joint military 
activities with Russia, such as exercises, port visits and 
conferences, in early March 2014.51 
50  Ilya Kramnik, “RIMPAC: Are Moscow and Washington 
Forging a Naval Shield?”, Voice of Russia, 6 August 2012, 
http://english.ruvr.ru/2012_08_06/RIMPAC-are-Moscow-and-
Washington-forging-a-marine-shield/; William Cole, “China 
to Debut at RIMPAC while Russia Bows Out”, Stars and Stripes, 
16 April 2014, http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/china-to-
debut-at-rimpac-while-russia-bows-out-1.278293. 
51  “DOD Puts Military-to-Military Activities with Russia on 
Hold”, U.S. Department of Defense, official website, 3 March 
2014, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id= 
121759. 
Limited Capacity for Regional 
Power Projection 
If one examines the central parameters, Russia 
appears to be one of the leading military powers 
of East Asia. With 845,000 troops it comes in fourth 
behind China, the United States and North Korea; 
its defence budget of $68 billion was third-largest in 
2013, but a long way behind Washington and Beijing 
(see Table 1). Here it must be remembered that Mos-
cow only has part of its forces permanently based in 
the Eastern Military District. Although the Eastern 
Military District enjoys top priority, alongside the 
Southern, for provision of modern weaponry, the tech-
nology gap is likely to be unbridgeable vis-à-vis the 
United States and its East Asian allies, and will come 
into play with respect to China in coming years.52 
Only in nuclear warheads is Russia still on a level with 
Washington with a clear lead over China and the other 
countries of East Asia. Together with expanded early 
warning and air defence capabilities, nuclear deter-
rence therefore represents the main insurance against 
potential dangers and threats on Russia’s eastern 
borders. 
In the military sphere a great power is character-
ised not only by its ability to guarantee its own secu-
rity but also its capacity to project power beyond its 
own borders. Here Moscow’s record is considerably 
weaker. This applies above all in the naval sphere, 
which is decisive in this region. Moscow’s Pacific Fleet 
possesses fewer tactical submarines and large vessels 
than China, Japan or even South Korea (see Table 1), 
and not all of them are operational. Moscow is now 
moving to modernise its Pacific Fleet, which is due in 
2014 to begin receiving its first new warships since the 
end of the Soviet Union, including several corvettes, 
support vessels and a Mistral class helicopter carrier 
ordered from France.53 But even if the modernisation 
programme is successfully implemented, Moscow 
will still lack two decisive elements required to project 
power on a grand scale across the Russian-Chinese 
land border: aircraft carriers and foreign bases. The 
only Russian aircraft carrier dates from the Soviet era, 
52  Margarete Klein and Kristian Pester, Russia’s Armed Forces 
on Modernisation Course: Progress and Perspectives of Military Reform, 
SWP Comments 9/2014 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, January 2014). 
53  Dmitry Boltenkov, “The Russian Pacific Fleet”, Moscow 
Defense Brief 33, no. 1 (2013): 24–27; John C. K. Daly, “Russia’s 
Pacific Fleet Receives New Ships, Missions”, Eurasia Daily 
Monitor 11, no. 47 (12 March 2014). 
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Table 1 
Military capabilities in East Asia, 2013 
 Russia China Japan United States North Korea South Korea 
Active military personnel  845,000  2,333,000  247,150  1,492,200  1,190,000  655,000 
Defence budget ($ billion)  68  112  51  600  ?  32 
Main Battle Tanks  2,550  6,940  777  2,338  3,500  2,414 
Tactical submarines  45 (18 in the 
 Pacific Fleet) 
 66  18  58  72  23 
Principal surface vessels  33 (9 in the 
 Pacific Fleet) 
 70  47  107  3  22 
Aircraft carriers  1  1  0  10  0  0 
Aircraft  1,389  2,193  552  1,438  603  568 
Source: Based on figures from International Institute for Strategic Studies, ed., The Military Balance 2014: The Annual Assessment of Global 
Military Capabilities and Defence Economics (London: Routledge, 2014). 
 
belongs to the Northern Fleet and is not fully opera-
tional. Washington, by comparison, plans to deploy 
six of its eleven carriers in the Pacific,54 while China 
put its first aircraft carrier into service in 2012 and 
appears to intend to develop more. After giving up its 
Vietnamese naval facility at Cam Ranh Bay in 2002, 
Moscow now possesses no foreign bases at all in East 
Asia. For this reason Russia plays almost no role as a 
military actor, especially in South-East Asia. Unlike 
China and the United States it cannot use its armed 
forces to back up its claims in the region. Nor can 
Russia be expected to massively expand its forces 
in South-East Asia, where there are neither serious 
threats nor allies to protect that would justify the 
enormous expenditure involved.55 
 
 
54  “Remarks by Secretary Panetta at the Shangri-La Dialogue 
in Singapore” (see note 48). 
55  Russia has been working for some years to strengthen 
its naval presence in South-East Asia. According to Defence 
Minister Sergei Shoigu, talks are in progress with Vietnam 
about shared use of Cam Ranh Bay as a logistical base and 
with Singapore about expanding port visits. Although both 
would allow Russia to keep naval vessels in the region for 
longer periods than currently possible, such arrangements 
are no substitute for proper military bases. “Russia Seeks 
Several Military Bases Abroad – Defense Minister”, RIA Novosti, 
26 February 2014, http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20140226/ 
187917901/Russia-Seeks-Several-Military-Bases-Abroad--
Defense-Minister.htm. 
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After the demise of the Soviet Union, Moscow’s in-
fluence in East Asia evaporated and it declined to 
the status of “distant neighbour” in regional percep-
tions.56 Russia’s new self-image as a “Euro-Pacific 
power” is associated with efforts to prevent further 
marginalisation and re-establish Russia politically 
as a great power in the region. 
Russia and China: “Strategic Partnership” 
with a Weak Regional Pillar 
Since the end of the Soviet era the focus of Russian 
East Asia policy has been on expanding relations with 
China. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Gorba-
chev began a gradual normalisation of the Sino-Soviet 
relationship, which continued under Yeltsin. In the 
subsequent period Russia and China successively up-
graded their political relations, from “constructive 
partnership” (1994) through “strategic partnership of 
coordination” (1996), codified in the friendship treaty 
of 2001, to a “comprehensive strategic partnership of 
coordination” (2010). Thus, over the course of time, a 
network of regular dialogue formats has been spun 
on different levels, with the strategic security consul-
tations initiated in 2005at its heart.57 
Even if political relations with Beijing are the 
closest Moscow maintains with any East Asian coun-
try, it is questionable whether the “strategic partner-
ship” actually helps Russia to expand its position in 
the region. Firstly, their cooperation in East Asia is 
weak. Whereas an easing of bilateral conflicts like 
border demarcation was central to the “normalisa-
tion” of the 1990s, global motives were decisive in 
the upgrade to “strategic partnership” in the guise 
56  Tsuneo Akaha, “A Distant Neighbor: Russia’s Search to 
Find Its Place in East Asia”, Global Asia 7, no. 2 (2012): 8–22. 
57  Annual meetings of the two heads of government have 
been held since 1996, and there are also more than twenty 
different intergovernmental committees and sub-committees. 
Victor Larin, “Russia and China: New Trends in Bilateral Rela-
tions and Political Cooperation”, in From APEC 2011 to APEC 
2012: American and Russian Perspectives on Security and Cooperation 
in the Asia-Pacific, ed. Rouben Azizian and Artyom Lukin (Hono-
lulu and Vladivostok, 2012), 178–88 (180). 
of shared criticism of the US-dominated world order. 
In contrast, political cooperation specifically in rela-
tion to East Asia has to date been sporadic and largely 
restricted to condemning Washington’s claim to re-
gional leadership and coordinating individual aspects 
of Russian and Chinese North Korea policy in the UN 
Security Council. 
Secondly, China demonstrates little interest in 
functioning as a “door-opener” or “force multiplier for 
Russia’s ambitions in East Asia.58 The reason for this 
lies in diverging ideas about regional order and roles 
and in the asymmetrical balance of power. Moscow’s 
wish to be an equal participant in a multi-polar 
regional order is at odds with the Chinese claim to 
leadership in East Asia. Even joint initiatives, such as 
one for an “open, transparent and equal security and 
cooperation architecture in the Asia-Pacific region” 
that the two sides first formulated on 27 September 
2010, cannot disguise the fundamental differences. 
In it Russia and China call on states in the region to 
agree on shared principles such as territorial integrity, 
non-interference in internal affairs, non-alignment 
and equal and indivisible security.59 Leaving aside the 
58  Leszek Buszynski, “Overshadowed by China”, in The Future 
of China-Russia Relations, ed. James A. Bellacqua (Lexington: 
The University Press of Kentucky, 2009). 
59  These principles encompass respect for sovereignty, in-
dependence and territorial integrity; non-intervention in 
the internal affairs of other states, including avoiding acts 
directed towards overthrowing governments or creating 
internal destabilisation; equal and indivisible security, under-
stood as respect for states’ legitimate interests; renunciation 
of threat or use of force; non-alignment; and renunciation of 
cooperation directed against third parties. The Russian-China 
initiative also calls for intensified cross-border cooperation 
between the countries of the Asia-Pacific region and greater 
collaboration on non-traditional threats. “Sovmestnoe zayav-
lenie Rossijskoi Federatsii i Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki 
o vsestoronnem uglublenii rossiisko-kitaiskikh otnoshenii 
partnerstva i strategicheskogo vsaimodeistviia” [Joint declara-
tion of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of 
China on the new stage of comprehensive partnership and 
strategic cooperation between the two countries], President of 
Russia, official website (Russian), 27 September 2010, http:// 
news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/719. The joint initiative of Septem-
ber 2010 formed the basis of a proposal for an Asia-Pacific 
security architecture, put forward by Russia and China to-
gether with Brunei at the East Asia Summit in November 
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Russia and China: “Strategic Partnership” with a Weak Regional Pillar 
extremely brief and vague nature of the Russian-
Chinese initiative, the two sides also grant it differ-
ent weight. Moscow is very keen on implementation. 
Alongside the prestige associated with being the ini-
tiator of a regional security architecture, it would 
profit from a real gain in power if the latitude of the 
stronger regional actors, first and foremost the United 
States and China, were reined in by broad and enforce-
able principles such as “equal and indivisible secu-
rity”. It is therefore Moscow that works hardest to pro-
mote the joint proposal to the regional audience.60 
For Beijing, on the other hand, the initiative appears 
to possess a more tactical value extending no further 
than cultivating the outward image of a peaceful 
power and coopting Russian support to delegitimise 
Washington’s military alliances in the region. That is 
the point of the demand for non-alignment. 
A third reason why its “strategic partnership” with 
China offers little to further Russia’s ambitions in East 
Asia is that there have been few issues where Beijing 
depended on Moscow’s support. China undertook cor-
respondingly little to involve Russia more strongly in 
the resolution of regional problems. Thus it was not 
Beijing, but Pyongyang, that in 2006 insisted on Mos-
cow’s participation in the newly established six-party 
talks.61 China also sought first and foremost to 
strengthen regional institutions in which there was 
no place for Russia (or the United States), such as the 
ASEAN Plus Three. The situation has changed some-
what since 2011, with the US “pivot” and Beijing’s 
escalating territorial dispute with Japan over the Sen-
kaku/Diaoyu Islands increasing China’s interest in 
keeping Russia close in East Asia. But for the Chinese 
this seems to mean a Russian junior partnership in 
selected fields rather than a comprehensive relation-
ship of equals. 
2013. “Comment by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey 
Lavrov Regarding the Eighth East Asia Summit”, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, official website, 
10 October 2013, http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/ 
e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/b6a8e653f1047515 
44257c0800496fcd!OpenDocument. 
60  The principle of “indivisible security” is understood as 
meaning that no party will take action that substantially 
impairs the security of another. For example, Moscow could 
demand that the United States cease its planning for a missile 
defence system in East Asia. “Comment by the Russian For-
eign Minister Sergey Lavrov Regarding the Eighth East Asia 
Summit” (see note 59). 
61  Seung-Ho Joo and Tae-Hwan Kwak, eds., North Korea’s Second 
Nuclear Crisis and North East Asian Security (Aldershot and Bur-
lington, VT, 2007), 148. 
That is reflected in Beijing’s expectation that Mos-
cow subordinate its interests in the event of conflict. 
In 2012 it became known that Gazprom was planning 
a joint venture with its Vietnamese partner PetroViet-
nam to develop offshore oil and gas fields in waters 
disputed between Beijing and Hanoi. The Chinese 
leadership immediately threatened not only to pull 
out of lucrative Russian-Chinese energy deals, but also 
demanded in unusually acerbic terms that a “com-
pany from a third country that is not related to the 
South China Sea, stay away from the disputed areas, 
and not to participate in their development before the 
territorial issue will be resolved”.62 When the fronts 
hardened in the Chinese-Japanese territorial dispute 
over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from 2011, Beijing 
urged Moscow to take a clear stance in support of its 
“strategic partner”.63 As far as Chinese territorial 
conflicts in the South and East China Seas are con-
cerned, the Kremlin attempts a balancing act. While 
supporting Beijing by opposing the internationalisa-
tion of conflict resolution demanded by the United 
States and others, it resists cooptation by emphasising 
Russia’s neutrality on the issue.64 
In these ways, Russia is cautiously edging away 
from its previously Sinocentric course. Nobody in the 
Russian debate is calling for a complete turn away 
from Beijing, but the growing asymmetry in the bi-
lateral relationship is leading experts and politicians 
to argue for any expansion of the “strategic partner-
ship” with Beijing to be supplemented with a policy of 
expanding Russia’s own latitude and securing broader 
recognition as a regional power. To that end, they 
argue, Moscow should diversify its political relations 
in East Asia, demonstrate greater engagement in 
solving regional conflicts and participate more ener-
getically in multilateral processes.65 
62  Quoted from Dmitry Mosyakov, “Policy of the Soviet 
Union/Russia in Asia-Pacific and in the Conflict over the 
Islands of the South China Sea in the Past and Present”, Hoi 
Nghi Hoi Thao, http://hoinghihoithao.com/scs/panel5/V,3% 
20-%20Dmitry%20Mosyakov.pdf. 
63  In August 2012 Moscow turned down Beijing’s offer of 
cooperation on their respective territorial disputes with 
Tokyo. National Institute for Defense Studies, ed., East Asian 
Strategic Review 2013 (see note 34), 272. 
64  Stephen Blank, “Russia Plays Both Sides against the 
Middle on Senkaku Islands”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 9, no. 209 
(14 November 2012). Moscow recognises China’s “core inter-
ests” to Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan, and has agreed to refrain 
from supplying arms to Taiwan. 
65  Anna Kireeva, “Russia’s East Asia Policy: New Opportuni-
ties and Challenges”, Perceptions 17, no. 4 (2012): 49–78 (71); 
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Russia and the United States in East Asia: 
Untapped Cooperation Potential 
Better relations with the United States are indispensa-
ble for any successful Russian diversification strategy 
in East Asia. The biggest advocates of close regional 
cooperation with Washington are the rather small and 
politically increasingly marginalised group of “West-
ernizers” who have been arguing since the 1990s that 
the integration into the Western community that the 
country seeks should also be reflected in its East Asia 
policy. The issue here is not a formal alliance with the 
United States, as even the “Westernizers” accept the 
necessity of good neighbourly relations with China for 
economic and security reasons. But they urge for the 
United States and its allies Japan and South Korea to 
be granted clear priority as Moscow’s “strategic part-
ners” in East Asia.66 In a context of growing asymme-
try in the Russian-Chinese relationship, increasing 
numbers of mainstream “realist” experts have also 
been arguing since the end of the 2000s for greater 
cooperation with Washington in East Asia. However, 
unlike the “Westernizers” these latter regard this not 
as a clear prioritisation but only a supplement to a 
continuing close relationship with China. Russia’s 
“realists” hope that this would position their country 
as a sought-after “swing state” between China and the 
United States. By playing the “China card” against 
Washington and the “American card” against Beijing 
they hope to position Moscow to gain concessions and 
recognition as a regional power from both sides and 
to expand its regional leeway.67 
To date, however, Washington and Moscow have 
largely ignored one another as potential East Asian 
partners. Political dialogue and practical cooperation 
occur almost exclusively in the multilateral frame-
work, for example in the six-party talks, while the 
Dmitri Trenin, “Moscow-Tokyo Anti-China Alliance Not Real”, 
Global Times, 27 April 2013; Fyodor Lukyanov, “The Secret to 
North Koreas’s Survival”, Russia in Global Affairs, 12 April 2012, 
http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/redcol/The-Secret-to-North-Koreas-
Survival-15518. 
66  Thomas E. Graham and Dmitri Trenin, “Why the Reset 
Should be Reset”, New York Times, 12 December 2012. 
67  Igor Zevelev, “A New Realism for the 21st Century: U.S.-
China Relations and Russia’s Choice”, Russia in Global Affairs, 
27 December 2012, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/A-New-
Realism-for-the-21st-Century-15817; Karaganov, “Russia’s 
Asian Strategy” (see note 7); Artyom Lukin, “Russia: Between 
the US and China”, East Asia Forum, 24 July 2012, http://www. 
eastasiaforum.org/2012/07/24/russia-between-the-us-and-
china-2/. 
region is more or less absent from the bilateral agenda. 
The “reset” (2009–2011) correspondingly lacked any 
East Asian component.68 
The two sides have different reasons for minimising 
political interaction. The Kremlin looks at the United 
States through the lens of global and Euro-Atlantic 
rivalry and sees it more as a regional problem than 
a part of any solution. Thus in January 2014 Foreign 
Minister Sergey Lavrov accused the United States of 
using the “pretext” of the North Korean nuclear pro-
gramme “to build up a proportionless [sic] military 
potential in this region”.69 In his third presidential 
term, Putin is also increasingly stirring anti-American 
sentiment for domestic political reasons. 
In Washington’s eyes Russia in East Asia is not so 
much a problem as a quantité négligeable, which can 
neither contribute actively to the resolution of regional 
problems nor possesses (outside the UN Security Coun-
cil) sufficient disruptive potential to hinder the pur-
suit of American interests.70 It is thus no surprise that 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made absolutely no 
mention of Russia in her programmatic “America’s 
Pacific Century” of October 2011.71 Isolated criticism is 
also heard in American expert circles to the effect that 
marginalising Russia leads Moscow to lean closer to 
Beijing, which in view of China’s growing power can-
not be in US interests. To avoid that, the critics say, a 
strategic dialogue should be initiated with Moscow on 
central East Asian issues, followed by intensified prac-
tical cooperation, for example on the North Korean 
question or in the development of regional institu-
68  Furthermore, the few initiatives for political dialogue on 
East Asia are low-level. A security dialogue involving Russian, 
Japanese and American think-tanks was launched in 2010, 
but ceased after being elevated from “track 2” to “track 1.5” 
(with official government representatives joining the experts) 
in July 2012. Hideki Asari, Alexander Dynkin and Andrew 
Kuchins, “Japan-Russia-US Trilateral Conference on the Secu-
rity Challenges in Northeast Asia” (Tokyo: Japan Institute of 
International Affairs, July 2012), http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/ 
report/20120621e-JA-RUS-US.pdf; National Institute for Defense 
Studies, ed., East Asian Strategic Review 2013 (see note 34), 282. 
69  “Speech by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov 
and his Answers to Questions from the Mass Media during 
the Press Conference Summarising the Results of the Activi-
ties of Russian Diplomacy”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation, official website, 21 January 2014, http:// 
www.mid.ru/BDOMP/Brp_4.nsf/arh/9ECCD0C0F39435F344257C
6A003247B2?OpenDocument. 
70  Bobo Lo, Russia, China and the United States. From Strategic 
Triangularism to the Post-Modern Triangle (Paris, 2010), 23f. 
71  Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century”, Foreign Policy, 
11 October 2011. 
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New Dynamism in the Russian-Japanese Relationship 
tions.72 In view of the deterioration in relations in 
the course of the Ukraine crisis, however, President 
Obama is unlikely to seek greater cooperation with 
Moscow in East Asia. Anyway, while such cooperation 
would be unlikely to produce much in the way of 
short-term successes it would offer more ammunition 
to Obama’s critics, who are already applying pressure 
over the failed “reset”. At least in the medium term 
there is therefore little prospect of Russia being able 
to position itself as a courted “swing state” between 
China and the United States. After losing the “Ameri-
can option”, the extent to which Moscow can avoid 
being forced into a political junior partnership with 
Beijing in East Asia now will depend more strongly 
than ever on its success in diversifying its political 
relations with the other regional actors. 
New Dynamism in the 
Russian-Japanese Relationship 
In that respect, relations with Japan play a decisive 
role. And here Moscow’s diversification efforts have 
shown more progress during President Putin’s third 
term. Although bilateral relations continue to suffer 
from the ongoing Kuril conflict and the absence of 
a peace treaty, they passed their low point during 
Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency. Although his moderni-
sation agenda should actually have made Japan the 
more interesting partner in East Asia, Medvedev not 
only ignored Tokyo but burdened the relationship 
through provocations and a closing of ranks with 
Beijing. In November 2011 he was the first Russian to 
visit the Kuril Islands, drawing a sharp rebuke from 
Tokyo, and in the relationship with Japan in general 
stressed the traditional interpretation of a relation-
ship between “victors and vanquished”. For example, 
on Medvedev’s initiative the Duma declared 2 Septem-
ber, the anniversary of Japan’s capitulation in the 
Second World War, a national day of remembrance. 
In a joint declaration with Beijing in September 2010 
he also declared that the cooperation between the two 
sides in the Second World War represented a “solid 
72  Jeffrey Mankoff and Oleg Barabanov, Prospects for U.S.-Russia 
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region (Cambridge, MA, July 2013), 
http://us-russiafuture.org/publications/working-group-papers/ 
prospects-for-u-s-russia-cooperation-in-the-asia-pacific-region/; 
Graham and Trenin, “Why the Reset Should Be Reset” (see 
note 66). 
basis” for today’s “strategic partnership”.73 Such 
harking back to past glory served not only to placate 
domestic conservative nationalist critics, but also to 
underline regional ambitions (not only) vis-à-vis Japan. 
Whereas short-term tactical thinking driven by 
both domestic and foreign policy concerns dominated 
Medvedev’s policy towards Japan, a more strongly 
strategic line can be observed since Putin returned to 
the presidency. Tokyo is now seen as an important 
potential partner: politically to expand autonomy in 
East Asia and economically for the modernisation of 
Siberia and the Far East. In order to smooth the way 
Putin announced in March 2012, following his re-
election, that it was time for “hajime” (the command 
to begin in judo) for new talks on the Kuril Islands 
question, to seek a “hikiwake” (a compromise accept-
able to both sides).74 At the same time Japan’s strategic 
environment worsened as the nuclear conflict with 
North Korea and its territorial dispute with China 
both escalated. In Tokyo this generated renewed inter-
est in upgrading cooperation with Moscow and seeing 
a more independent Russian role in East Asia.75 The 
“relaunch” of the Russian-Japanese relationship an-
nounced by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is intended to 
prevent Moscow facilitating China’s drive for regional 
dominance as its junior partner.76 
The Russian-Japanese rapprochement has achieved 
rapid successes since 2012. During the first visit to 
Russia by a Japanese prime minister in ten years, in 
April 2013, the two sides agreed not only to resume 
talks on the Kuril question and a peace agreement,77 
73  Akaha, “A Distant Neighbor” (see note 56), 11; “Sovmestnoe 
zayavlenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii D.A. Medvedeva i 
Predcedatelia Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki Chu Tsintao v 
sviazi s 65-letiem okonchaniia Vtoroi mirovoi voini” [Joint dec-
laration of the President of the Russian Federation, D. A. Med-
vedev, and the State President of the People’s Republic of 
China, Hu Jintao, marking the 65th anniversary of the end 
of the Second World War], President of Russia, official web-
site (Russian), 27 October 2010, http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_ 
notes/720. 
74  Quoted from Hideki Soejima and Akiyoshi Komaki, “Putin 
Proposes Starting over in Negotiations over Northern Terri-
tories”, Asahi Shimbun, 2 March 2012, http://ajw.asahi.com/ 
article/behind_news/politics/AJ201203020054. 
75  Céline Pajon, Japan-Russia: Toward a Strategic Partnership? 
(Paris, September 2013). 
76  “Meeting with Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe”, 
President of Russia, official website, 18 June 2013, http:// 
eng.kremlin.ru/news/5603. 
77  “Press Statements and Answers to Journalists’ Questions 
Following Russian-Japanese Talks”, President of Russia, offi-
cial website, 29 April 2013, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/ 
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but also established a new regular discussion format 
for their foreign and defence ministers (“2+2”). This 
is significant to the extent that such formats are nor-
mally reserved for close allies. At the first 2+2 meeting 
in November 2013 the two sides demonstrated their 
willingness to expand dialogue and practical cooper-
ation beyond bilateral issues and to address regional 
and security questions. They agreed that their navies 
would hold joint search and rescue exercises and co-
operate on fighting terrorism and piracy. A joint con-
ference on cyber-security is planned for 2014.78 
Despite these advances, any improvements in the 
Russian-Japanese relationship are still fragile and not 
free of contradictions. President Putin has also con-
tinued the policy of demonstrating strength against 
Tokyo, as evidenced by violations of Japanese airspace 
by Russian warplanes and the Russian-Chinese naval 
manoeuvre Joint Sea 2013 in the Sea of Japan. It is 
difficult to judge how willing the two sides might be 
to compromise in the territorial question.79 The an-
nexation of the Crimea and the associated wave of 
nationalist propaganda in Russia raised doubts over 
the Russian stance in Japan,80 but both sides were 
keen to limit the damage to bilateral relations 
wrought by the Ukraine crisis. Although Japan joined 
the other Western states in imposing sanctions on 
Russia, they were only moderate in scope.81 The crisis 
5339. The first round of talks on the Kuril question at the 
level of deputy foreign minister was held in August 2013 
in Moscow, the second in January 2014 in Tokyo. 
78  “‘A New Page’: Russia, Japan Hold First 2+2 Talks, Aim to 
Boost Military Cooperation”, Russia Today, 2 November 2013, 
http://rt.com/news/russia-japan-first-talks-134; Fiona Hill, 
“Gang of Two: Russia and Japan Make a Play for the Pacific”, 
Foreign Affairs, 27 November 2013, http://www.foreignaffairs. 
com/articles/140288/fiona-hill/gang-of-two. 
79  Although Putin promised a compromise acceptable to 
both sides (“hikiwake”), it remained unclear whether this 
went any further than the Soviet offer of 1956. This involved 
only the return of two smaller islands and is rejected by 
Japan as unacceptable. Akihiro Iwashita, “The Northern Ter-
ritories and Russia-Japanese Relations”, Russian Analytical 
Digest, no. 132 (11 July 2013): 2–4. 
80  Tokyo also fears that the annexation of Crimea could 
create a precedent for territorial conflicts in East Asia, in-
cluding China’s claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Dmitri 
Trenin, “Will Japan and Russia Escape the New Cold War?” 
Eurasia Outlook, 21 April 2014, http://carnegie.ru/ 
eurasiaoutlook/?fa=55384. 
81  Although Japan sharply condemned the annexation of 
Crimea, imposed travel restrictions on twenty-three promi-
nent Russians and suspended talks over visa facilitation and a 
new investment agreement, it has not to date joined financial 
sanctions such as freezing assets.  
has highlighted their mutual interest in continuing 
the rapprochement for strategic reasons, namely to 
preserve and expand their independence toward 
China. However, the crisis also made it clear that for 
any lasting improvement in relations Moscow will 
have to convince Tokyo of its reliability by participat-
ing in confidence-building measures, refraining from 
provocations, and avoiding instrumentalising the 
bilateral relationship for domestic political ends. Only 
then can the Russian leadership use its relations with 
Tokyo to expand its political options in East Asia. 
Russia and the Two Koreas: 
Russia as Regional Conflict-Solver? 
A new dynamic can also be detected in Russia’s foreign 
policy towards the Korean Peninsula since the end of 
the 2000s. Here Moscow is interested in more than just 
expanding bilateral relations in the frame of the diver-
sification strategy. In order to be recognised as a great 
power in the region Russia must prove that it can con-
tribute to resolving the central conflicts in East Asia. 
These include the dispute over the North Korean 
nuclear programme. 
Every Russian leader since the conflict began has 
sought to be included in the multilateral negotiations. 
They were excluded in the 1990s partly because Presi-
dent Yeltsin had largely abandoned the close relation-
ship with North Korea forged during the Soviet era. 
Instead he concentrated primarily on developing rela-
tions with South Korea, which were only established 
in 1991. The one-sidedness of Moscow’s Korea policy 
turned out to be counterproductive, because without 
channels for influencing Pyongyang, involving Mos-
cow offered no benefits to Seoul, Washington and 
Tokyo. For that reason Russia was involved in neither 
the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisa-
tion set up in 1995 by the United States, South Korea 
and Japan, nor in the four-party talks of 1996 to 1999.82 
The coordinates of Russia’s Korea policy shifted 
after Putin took office in 2000, with Moscow pursuing 
a combination of two approaches. The first of these 
82  In 1994 the Russian foreign ministry was already pro-
posing a six-party conference involving the two Koreas, the 
United States, China, Japan and Russia, as well as possibly the 
IAEA and the United Nations. Georgy Toloraya, “The Six Party 
Talks: A Russian Perspective”, Asian Perspective 32, no. 4 (2008): 
45–69 (45f.); Leszek Buszynski, “Russia and North Korea: Di-
lemmas and Interests”, Asian Survey 49, no. 5 (2009): 809–30 
(811f.). 
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lies in continuing the efforts begun in the 1990s to 
achieve Russian participation in multilateral conflict-
resolution formats. The second comprises acquiring 
leverage over both Korean states by stepping up bi-
lateral relations and promoting trilateral cooperation. 
Here Putin has integrated the lessons learned during 
the 1990s. While continuing to develop political rela-
tions with the South, which is an attractive partner 
for economic modernisation especially given that its 
political relations with Russia (unlike Japan’s) are not 
burdened by territorial disputes, Putin at the same 
time also revitalised the bilateral relationship with 
North Korea. In February 2000 he signed a new friend-
ship treaty with Pyongyang and in July of the same 
year travelled to North Korea, as the first Russian head 
of state to do so. North Korean President Kim Jong-Il 
made return visits to Russia in 2001 and 2002.83 
Putin’s new line paid off in 2003, when Pyongyang in-
sisted on including Moscow in the new six-party talks. 
Even if Moscow was unable to convincingly follow 
through on its asserted role as major regional power 
during the subsequent negotiations, simply partici-
pating represented a significant prize.84 
The collapse of the six-party talks in 2009 was there-
fore a setback not only for Russia’s Korea policy, but 
also for its East Asia ambitions in general. The Kremlin 
is now concentrating on the second pillar of its Korea 
strategy, pushing bilateral relations and trilateral 
cooperation projects with Seoul and Pyongyang. Even 
if the goal of a “strategic partnership”85 agreed with 
Seoul in 2008 remains unfulfilled, both sides have ex-
panded political dialogue and cooperation. Examples 
include the Russia-Republic of Korea Dialogue with 
high-ranking politicians, held annually since 2010, 
and the “defense strategic talks” at the level of deputy 
defence minister, held for the first time in March 
2012.86 In parallel the Kremlin has intensified its rela-
83  Unlike the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and 
Mutual Assistance, which expired in 1991 but was automati-
cally extended until 1996, the new agreement includes no 
military assistance clause. 
84  Joo and Kwak, eds., North Korea’s Second Nuclear Crisis (see 
note 61), 148. 
85  “Interview to South Korean Media”, President of Russia, 
official website, 9 November 2010, http://eng.news.kremlin. 
ru/news/1277/print. 
86  “S. Korea, Russia to Hold First Defense Strategic Talks on 
Exchanges”, Bahrain News Agency, 12 March 2012, http://www. 
bna.bh/portal/en/news/498275?date=2012-03-28; “Russia-
Republic of Korea Dialogue Forum”, President of Russia, offi-
cial website, 2 November 2011, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/ 
3012/print. 
tions with Pyongyang, staging the first Russian-
North Korean summit in nine years in August 2011. 
But above all Moscow has been pushing for progress 
on the planned trilateral projects: a gas pipeline, elec-
tricity lines and a rail link, all from Russia via North 
Korea to the South.87 Their realisation would reap 
more than economic rewards for Moscow: Russia could 
expand its political influence into the Korean Pen-
insula and show itself to be a power capable of making 
an independent contribution to conflict containment. 
But although Moscow has invested growing political 
and economic capital in trilateral projects since 2011,88 
it finds itself still unable to overcome US and Chinese 
resistance and incapable of fulfilling the central pre-
condition: guaranteeing the reliability of transit 
through North Korea. 
Expansion of Political Relations with South-
East Asia: Focus on Vietnam and ASEAN 
Since the second half of the 2000s Moscow has been 
seeking to expand its political options in South-East 
Asia too. Russia’s almost complete withdrawal from 
that region in the 1990s increasingly transpired to be 
a drag on its new “Euro-Pacific” ambitions. Ultimately, 
South-East Asia has not only become an important 
arena of American-Chinese rivalry, but also the driving 
force for the development of multilateral institutions 
in East Asia as a whole, including the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit and ASEM. If Russia 
wished to be involved in these and recognised as a 
regional power, it had to present itself as a valuable 
partner in the eyes of the South-East Asian nations. 
Russia’s record to date is mixed. Although Moscow 
has been able to intensify diplomatic relations with all 
South-East Asian countries through summit meetings 
or talks at ministerial level, the substance of the politi-
cal dialogue varies enormously from country to coun-
87  Buszynski, “Russia and North Korea” (see note 82), 817f.; 
Dong-Ki Sung, “Putin’s Strategy on the Trans-Korean Gas Pipe-
line: In the Context of Pragmatic Realism”, Pacific Focus 28, 
no. 1 (2013): 43–61. 
88  In September 2012 Moscow cancelled 90 percent of Pyong-
yang’s outstanding $11 billion Soviet-era debts, sent 50,000 
tonnes of food aid to North Korea and entirely financed the 
rebuilding of the Russia-North Korea rail link from Chasan to 
Rajin. Beom-Shik Shin, Russia’s “Return” to Asia: How Should South 
Korea Respond? (Seoul: East Asia Institute, 30 December 2011), 
http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/135859/ 
ipublicationdocument_singledocument/b19c6175-082b-4360-
899c-f1b32e3a430b/en/2011123011132391.pdf. 
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try. The dialogues are weakest with Singapore and 
Brunei and with the US allies Thailand and the 
Philippines. Relations are broader with Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Myanmar, where regional and inter-
national as well as bilateral issues are discussed. 
Moscow profits from these countries’ scepticism 
regarding the expanding power of both the United 
States and China their desire for a multi-polar 
regional order. Malaysia, Indonesia and Myanmar 
regard stronger involvement of external forces such 
as Russia in regional affairs as a possible route to 
achieving that objective.89 
The political relationship has blossomed most with 
Vietnam, where Moscow can build on traditionally 
close relations dating from Soviet times. The “strategic 
partnership” with Hanoi proclaimed in 2001 was up-
graded in July 2012 to a “comprehensive strategic 
partnership” similar to that with Beijing.90 Vietnam 
is the one South-East Asian country with which broad-
based cooperation in fact assumes a strategic char-
acter. Here energy and defence industry cooperation 
are not merely economically driven, but also intended 
to strengthen the political autonomy of both coun-
tries vis-à-vis Beijing. For example, Gazprom is in-
volved in developing offshore oil and gas fields located 
close to waters whose ownership is disputed between 
China and Vietnam while the delivery of six Russian 
submarines coincided with the escalation of Vietnam-
ese-Chinese territorial disputes.91 The partnership 
proves advantageous for Moscow at the regional level 
too, for Vietnam is the most active of all the South-
East Asian nations in arguing for Russia to be accepted 
in the regional institutions where these countries co-
ordinate some of their policies. For example Moscow 
89  Paradorn Rangsimaporn, “Russia’s Search for Influence in 
South East Asia”, Asian Survey 49, no. 5 (2009): 786–808; Victor 
Sumsky, Mark Hong and Amy Lugg, eds., ASEAN-Russia: Foun-
dations and Future Prospects (Singapore, 2012); Elizabeth Wish-
nick, Russia: New Player in the South China Sea? PONARS Policy 
Memo 260 (Washington D.C.: PONARS, 2013). 
90  “Press Statements Following Russian-Vietnamese Talks”, 
President of Russia, official website, 27 July 2012, http:// 
eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/4225. 
91  The sale of six Kilo-class submarines was agreed in 2009; 
the first vessel was delivered in 2013. Frigates (Gepard), 
fighters (Sukhoi Su-30MK) and mobile coastal defence missile 
systems (Bastion-P) are also on order or already delivered. Carl 
Thayer, “The Bear Is Back: Russia Returns to Vietnam”, The 
Diplomat, 26 November 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/ 
11/the-bear-is-back-russia-returns-to-vietnam/. 
and Hanoi argued jointly for the East Asia Summit to 
devote greater attention to security issues.92 
As well as developing bilateral relations with the 
states of South-East Asia, Russia has also been working 
since the mid-2000s to expand its relationship with 
ASEAN, the most important regional organisation. 
Already in 1996 it became ASEAN dialogue partner, 
meaning that consultation formats were established 
from expert to ministerial level.93 After Russia joined 
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia 
in November 2004, both sides expanded their insti-
tutional and substantive cooperation. The first Russia-
ASEAN Summit in 2005 agreed a “progressive and 
comprehensive partnership” covering “political and 
security, economic and development cooperation”. 
At their second summit in 2010, the two sides also 
agreed to collaborate more closely to build a security 
and cooperation architecture.94 
Even if Russia’s overtures to ASEAN enabled it to 
join ASEM in 2010 and the East Asia Summit in 2011, 
the cooperation suffers – as it does with all South-East 
Asian countries apart from Vietnam – from the form 
being more advanced than the substance. Activities 
concentrate on prestigious summits, while the politi-
cal and social foundations and concrete joint projects 
remain weak.95 For example there are precious few 
medium-level political contacts, and their number 
will shrink yet further when politicians and civil 
servants trained in Soviet times enter retirement. 
92  Carlyle A. Thayer, “The Russia-Vietnam Comprehen-
sive Partnership”, East Asia Forum, 9 October 2012, http:// 
www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/10/09/the-russia-vietnam-
comprehensive-partnership/. 
93  Russia participates for example in the “Post-Ministerial 
Conferences”, which ASEAN holds regularly with its dialogue 
partners, and since 2010 has also attended the meetings 
between ASEAN defence ministers and dialogue partners. 
See ASEAN, “Joint Declaration on Partnership for Peace and 
Security and Prosperity and Development in the Asia Pacific 
Region”, June 2003, http://www.asean.org/news/item/joint-
declaration-of-the-foreign-ministers-of-the-russian-federation-
and-the-association-of-southeast-asian-nations-on-partnership-
for-peace-and-security-and-prosperity-and-development-in-the-
asia-pacific-region. 
94  ASEAN, “ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Relations”, June 2012, 
http://www.asean.org/news/item/asean-russia-dialogue-
relations. 
95  One indication of this is the scant funding of cooperation 
projects. A joint fund was established in 2005, to which Russia 
has been contributing $1.5 million annually since 2011. 
Rodolfo Severino and Moe Thuzar, “ASEAN Regionalism and 
the Future of ASEAN-Russia Relations”, in ASEAN-Russia: Foun-
dations and Future Prospects, ed. Sumsky, Hong and Lugg (see 
note 89), 25f. 
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Moreover, China, Japan, South Korea and the United 
States are much more important partners for the 
ASEAN states. This is reflected not least in the depth 
and breadth of topics addressed in the ASEAN Plus 
Three with Beijing, Tokyo and Seoul and at the ASEAN-
United States summits held annually since 2009. 
Russia is thus still far from its goal of achieving recog-
nition as a major regional power, rather than being 
regarded as merely an “also ran” in South-East Asia.96 
Russia’s Multilateral Efforts: 
More Status than Substance 
In order to expand its political influence in East Asia, 
Russia is also motivated to participate in all signifi-
cant multilateral institutions and to contribute to 
shaping the regional cooperation architecture. The 
first objective has already been achieved. Back in 1994 
Russia was accepted in the newly founded ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF), which discusses security issues 
at foreign minister level. In 1998, three years after 
applying for membership, it joined the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), which dedicates itself 
above all to trade liberalisation and economic co-
operation. Russia participated from the outset in the 
six-party talks initiated in 2003 and in 2010 was per-
mitted to join the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), where 
European and Asian states have discussed discuss 
political, economic and social questions since 1996.97 
Since 2011 Russia has also been represented at the 
East Asia Summit, a strategic discussion forum on 
political and economic questions at the level of heads 
of state and government founded in 2005. Today 
Russia thus belongs to the most important regional 
economic, political and security institutions. 
This in itself already represents a gain in prestige 
for Moscow, as it ultimately implies formal acceptance 
as an integral part of East Asia and the Asia-Pacific 
96  Quoted from William Kucera and Eva Pejsova, Russia’s 
Quiet Partnerships in Southeast Asia: Russia-Malaysia Strategic 
Partnership through Sabah Case Study (Bangkok, 2012), 8. 
97  Russia’s accession to ASEM was delayed by unclarity over 
its classification. It originally sought membership as a “Euro-
pean country”, then as an “Asian country”, generating resist-
ance among alternately among European and Asian mem-
bers. Only after the introduction of a new category of “Asian 
Europeans” was Russia able to join (along with Australia and 
New Zealand). When the category was abandoned in 2012 
Russia was put in the Asian regional group. Dmitry Kosyrev, 
“Russia Makes Its Debut at ASEM”, RIA Novosti, 7 October 2010, 
http://en.ria.ru/analysis/20101007/160866120.html. 
region.98 But if it is to be acknowledged as an im-
portant actor in the region, Russia will have to back 
up its membership of the institutions with greater 
substance. Although it operates quite decisively in 
certain areas and bodies,99 Russian engagement is 
extremely selective in timing and substance. Russia 
demonstrated its strongest presence in 2012, chairing 
the APEC summit in Vladivostok.100 While that meet-
ing gave Moscow an opportunity for public presenta-
tion, it was not an expression of a long-term strategy 
for deepening multilateral engagement; after the 
summit Russia massively scaled back its APEC activi-
ties and showed scant interest in following up its 
initiatives.101 Russia’s actions in the two regional 
institutions it most recently joined reveal a similar 
mixture of status-seeking and lack of strategy. In 
ASEM, where it has yet to put forward an initiative, 
Moscow’s interest appears to exhaust itself in the 
status associated with membership.102 While Moscow 
may be more assertive at the East Asia Summit, push-
ing proposals of its own in the fields of food security, 
energy policy and regional security architecture, it has 
at the same time sent a vexing message to the South-
East Asian states that argued particularly hard for its 
acceptance. Since Russia’s accession in 2011 neither its 
president nor prime minister have attended any of the 
summits. The Kremlin apparently fears having to take 
a clear position on China’s territorial conflicts with 
98  Only states that enjoy “substantial” relations with ASEAN 
and/or strong economic ties to the Asia-Pacific region may 
join APEC and the East Asia Summit. 
99  In the ASEAN Regional Forum Russia launched successful 
initiatives for greater cooperation on counter-terrorism, dis-
aster relief and cyber-security. “Speech of Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergey Lavrov at the Ministerial ‘Retreat’ of the 20th 
Session of the ASEAN Regional Forum for Security”, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, official website, 
2 July 2013, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/B3BACB4BA3CF6 
F1F44257B9E00503410. 
100  At the 2012 APEC summit in Vladivostok, Russia put on 
the agenda issues of importance to its own eastern regions 
(food security, transport) and to its East Asian ambitions (re-
gional economic integration, innovation for growth). Carlos 
Kuriyama, “Russia’s Economic Relations with the APEC 
Region”, in ASEAN-Russia: Foundations and Future Prospects, ed. 
Sumsky, Hong and Lugg (see note 89), 227. 
101  Katherine Magalif, “From Vladivostok to Bali: What Went 
Wrong?” Russia Direct, 9 October 2013, http://russia-direct.org/ 
content/vladivostok-bali-what-went-wrong. 
102  A review of Summit Statements and Ministerial Statements 
since 2011 on the ASEM website produced no evidence of 
any Russian initiative. http://www.aseminfoboard.org/see-all/ 
itemlist/. 
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other South-East Asian states there.103 While a reduced 
presence might evade that issue, it undermines Russia’s 
own efforts to be recognised as a valuable political part-
ner especially by the countries of South-East Asia.104 
These actions also weaken the credibility of Russian 
attempts to play an active role in the formation of a 
regional security and cooperation architecture. Mos-
cow has been complaining since the 1990s that East 
Asia possesses no functioning mechanisms for con-
sultation, cooperation and conflict resolution. While 
its own initiatives have changed over time, their goal 
has always been to secure Russia a place in East Asia 
commensurate with its ambitions. Until the mid-2000s 
Russia’s proposals – like its whole East Asia policy – 
concentrated on North-East Asia and consisted in seek-
ing to transform the six-party talks into a permanent 
and legally binding regional security arrangement. 
That would have made Russia part of a “concert of 
great powers” in the region.105 When the six-party 
talks stalled in 2009 and South-East Asia rose up Mos-
cow’s foreign policy agenda, this shifted the focus of 
the Russian proposals. Proposals for a regional secu-
rity and cooperation architecture now related to the 
entire Asia-Pacific region and shifted away from the 
goal of a single new institution to the approach of a 
“network” of existing formats.106 Together with China 
and Brunei, Russia introduced a first concrete pro-
posal at the East Asia Summit in October 2013. Even if 
the participating states did agreed to start a dialogue 
process on these questions, Moscow’s prospects of 
realising its own ideas here are poor. On the one hand 
the proposal is too vague and leaves unanswered the 
decisive questions of what mechanisms will enforce 
103  Just a few days later Prime Minister Medvedev partici-
pated in the more economically focussed APEC summit in 
Indonesia. Artyom Lukin, “Russian President Skipped East 
Asian Summit – Again”, Russian International Affairs Council 
blog, 13 October 2013, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/blogs/dvfu/ 
?id_4=745; Wishnick, Russia: New Player in the South China Sea? 
(see note 89), 6. 
104  Surin Pitsuwan, former ASEAN secretary-general, de-
scribed Putin’s absence from the 2013 East Asia Summit as 
“disappointing”. “Putin Is Latest Asia Summit No-show to 
Raise Eyebrows”, Rappler Latest News, 10 September 2013, 
http://www.rappler.com/world/regions/asia-pacific/40968-
putin-east-asia-summit. 
105  Toloraya, “The Six Party Talks” (see note 82), 64; Gilbert 
Rozman, “Russian Strategic Thinking on Asian Regionalism”, 
in Russian Strategic Thought toward Asia, ed. Gilbert Rozman, 
Kazuhiko Togo and Joseph P. Ferguson (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), 229–54 (238f.). 
106  “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation” 
(see note 1). 
the principles and how the existing institutions can 
work together more effectively. On the other hand, 
precisely where it is most concretely formulated the 
initiative could encounter stiff resistance from the 
United States and its East Asian allies. For Moscow’s 
proposal amounts to a de facto Russian veto. In the 
words of Foreign Minister Lavrov, the core principle of 
“indivisible security” rules out attempts by individual 
countries to expand their own security at the expense 
of other states.107 Under that interpretation the Krem-
lin (or Beijing) could demand that the United States 
terminate its missile defence planning or abandon its 
naval expansion in East Asia. Further, the principle 
of non-alignment would mean the dissolution of 
Washington’s bilateral military alliances. If Russia 
wishes to garner support for its proposals it will have 
to prove that they represent a substantive contribu-
tion to solving real problems in the region, rather 
than merely serving its own particular interests. 
Russia’s Weak “Soft Power” 
In order to be recognised as a great power in East Asia, 
Russia must develop “soft power” as well as “hard 
power”. Here it continues to exhibit great deficits. 
Russia’s economic, political and social trajectory since 
the end of the Cold War exercises no attraction for 
other countries in the region. Instead it is China that 
is becoming the alternative to the Western model. 
President Putin may be attempting especially hard in 
his third term to push Russia as the conservative alter-
native to the liberal democracies of Europe and the 
United States, and seeking to present it on the inter-
national stage as a defender of traditional principles 
of international law against Washington’s supposedly 
aggressive unilateral interventionism.108 But consider-
able doubts remain as to whether these methods can 
actually expand Russia’s “soft power” in East Asia. The 
Ukraine crisis demonstrated that Russia will also vio-
late central principles of international law, such as 
non-use of force, non-intervention in the internal affairs 
of other states, and territorial integrity. Here Russia 
107  “Interview by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov 
to Interfax News Agency”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation, official website, 21 December 2013, 
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/3C263964184AA8E744257C 
4E005A647F. 
108  “Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club”, 
President of Russia, official website, 19 September 2013, 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6007. 
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revealed that it follows the logic of power rather than 
the framework of norms. Additionally, Putin’s con-
servative political ideology lacks any attractive eco-
nomic component. 
Moreover Russia, although geographically Eurasian, 
is perceived culturally as clearly belonging to Europe 
rather than East Asia,109 and none of Moscow’s attempts 
to strengthen cultural exchange with East Asia can 
alter its image as a “distant neighbor”.110 Numerous 
events have been staged, for example the 2009 Year 
of the Russian Language in China or the Russian Cul-
tural Festival held annually in Japan since 2006. In 
the sphere of education, student exchanges have been 
especially encouraged. China and Vietnam are the two 
biggest countries of origin, with about 20,000 Chinese 
and 6,000 Vietnamese studying at Russian universities 
in 2013.111 Beyond that Russia has upgraded its uni-
versity infrastructure in its Far East, for example by 
expanding the Far Eastern Federal University in Vladi-
vostok. But Russia still comes far down the list of East 
Asian students’ preferences. By comparison there were 
194,000 Chinese and 15,500 Vietnamese studying in 
the United States in 2012.112 
Apart from student exchanges and tourism, societal 
ties between Russia and the East Asian countries tend 
to be weak. This also affects political relations. Above 
all at the middle level there is a lack of individuals 
with knowledge of the languages and cultures. This 
applies to Japan and South Korea, which cannot draw 
on contacts from the Cold War era, but equally to 
China and Vietnam, which always maintained close 
relations with Moscow, also in the field of education. 
Even in the 1990s many senior positions in China and 
Vietnam were still occupied by politicians and econo-
mists trained in the Soviet Union. Those connections 
are now becoming increasingly rare.113 
109  Akaha, “A Distant Neighbor” (see note 56). 
110  Ibid. 
111  “Russia Expects to Attract More Chinese Students”, 
People’s Daily Online, 16 May 2013, http://english.peopledaily. 
com.cn/203691/8246261.html; “Number of Overseas Viet-
namese Students in Russia Continues to Rise”, Communist 
Party of Vietnam Online Newspaper, 27 December 2013, http:// 
cpv.org.vn/cpv/Modules/News_English/News_Detail_E.aspx? 
CN_ID=628381&CO_ID=30184. 
112  “International Students in the United States”, Project 
Atlas, http://www.iie.org/Services/Project-Atlas/United-
States/International-Students-In-US. 
113  Peter Ferdinand, “Sino-Russian Relations: An Analytical 
Overview”, in Russia-China Relations: Current State, Alternative 
Futures, and Implications for the West, ed. Arkady Moshes and 
Matti Nojonen (Helsinki, 2013), 22–37 (36f.). 
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 The Economic Dimension: 
Achilles’ Heel of Russian East Asia Policy 
 
Alongside security challenges and political ambitions, 
Moscow’s turn towards East Asia is strongly motivated 
by economic interests. In Russia the region is perceived 
as an economic opportunity: as a market for exports 
and as a potential modernisation partner, especially 
for its own eastern territories. The Kremlin is well 
aware that Russia will only be recognised as a major 
regional power in East Asia if it can back up that claim 
economically. 
Since 2000 Moscow has succeeded in substantially 
increasing its trade volume with the East Asian states. 
Between 2000 and 2013 trade with Japan increased 
almost tenfold, with the ASEAN states elevenfold, with 
China twelvefold and with South Korea fourteenfold. 
In comparison the growth rates for trade with the 
European Union and the other CIS states have been 
comparatively modest (fivefold and four-and-a-half-
fold respectively; see Table 2). 
East Asia is becoming increasingly important for 
Russia’s foreign trade. From 2000 to 2013 the share 
of Moscow’s foreign trade accounted for by this region 
rose from 9.4 percent to 19.0 percent. China stands 
out particularly, its share growing from 4.9 to 10.3 
percent over the same period.114 East Asia has thus 
become Russia’s second regional trade partner after 
the European Union. Although the European Union’s 
share of Russian foreign trade is two-and-a-half times 
that of the East Asian states, it declined slightly from 
51.8 percent in 2000 to 49.1 percent in 2013. In eco-
nomic terms East Asia has already overtaken Russia’s 
two most important geopolitical reference regions, 
namely the post-Soviet space and the United States. 
The CIS countries’ share of Russian foreign trade has 
fallen from 18 percent in 2000 to 14.4 percent in 2013, 
while the already small figure for the United States 
contracted especially sharply, from 5 percent in 2000 
to 3.6 percent in 2013.115 
However, increasing trade with East Asia has been 
associated with changes in composition that pose 
great challenges for Russia’s economic position there. 
Firstly, while the region’s economies are becoming 
114  Based on figures from UNCTADStat Database, http:// 
unctad.org/en/Pages/Statistics.aspx (viewed 14 July 2014). 
115  UNCTADStat Database (viewed 14 July 2014). 
increasingly important for Russia’s foreign trade, the 
converse is much less the case. The imbalance is most 
conspicuous in Sino-Russian economic relations. In 
2010 China replaced Germany as Russia’s most impor-
tant trade partner. However, while China’s share of 
Russian foreign trade was 10.3 percent in 2013, Russia 
accounted for only 2.2 percent of Chinese foreign 
trade and is thus only a secondary trade partner for 
China. Growing political asymmetry in the Russian-
Chinese relationship is exacerbated by the economic 
trends. While China’s economy was about the same 
size as Russia’s at the beginning of the 1990s, it had 
grown three times as large by 2013, with a GDP of 
$8,230 billion (compared to $1,899 billion).116 The same 
applies to other East Asian countries: Russia is a less 
important trading partner for them than they are for 
Russia, and more or less negligible compared with 
trade within the region or with the European Union 
and the United States. Russia accounts for just 2.2 per-
cent of Japanese foreign trade, 2.1 percent of South 
Korean and 0.8 percent of ASEAN’s.117 
Moscow’s economic ambitions in East Asia are 
further burdened, secondly, by its balance of trade 
problems. Although its trade balance is still positive 
in relation to Japan, South Korea and the ASEAN 
states, only with South Korea has Russia been able to 
maintain its export share over the past decade. With 
all other East Asian partners the trade balance shifted 
to Russia’s disadvantage. From 2000 to 2013 the share 
of Russian exports in its overall trade with Japan fell 
from 81 to 64 percent, with the ASEAN countries from 
70 to 63 percent and with China from 73 to just 40 
percent, which representing the largest drop.118 The 
increase in trade volume, it can be concluded, thus 
stems less from Russian firms opening up new mar-
kets in East Asia than from East Asian businesses im-
proving their position on the Russian market. 
116  Trading Economics, “Russia GDP”, http://www. 
tradingeconomics.com/russia/gdp; “China GDP”, http:// 
www.tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp. 
117  UNCTADStat Database (viewed 14 July 2014). 
118  Based on figures from UNCTADStat Database, http:// 
unctad.org/en/Pages/Statistics.aspx (viewed 14 July 2014). 
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Energy and Arms: Ambivalently Competitive 
Table 2 
Russia’s trade with East Asia ($ million) 
Trade partner Russian imports 
from/exports to 
2000 2005 2010 2013 
China Imports  1,972  11,763  34,336  51,964 
 Exports  5,248  13,048  19,783  35,229 
 Total  7,219  24,811  54,119  87,193 
Japan Imports  645  5,359  9,192  11,690 
 Exports  2,764  3,740  12,494  20,718 
 Total  3,409  9,099  21,685  32,408 
South Korea Imports  706  4,204  7,851  11,109 
 Exports  972  2,359  10,408  12,551 
 Total  1,678  6,563  18,259  23,660 
ASEAN Imports  478  1,982  4,376  6,513 
 Exports  1,120  2,159  6,514  10,962 
 Total  1,598  4,141  10,889  17,475 
EU 28 Imports  20,371  64,203  106,836  148,060 
 Exports  56,252  139,149  184,669  266,448 
 Total  76,623  203,352  291,506  414,508 
CIS Imports  12,847  19,417  31,218  44,807 
 Exports  13,781  32,252  48,591  76,294 
 Total  26,628  51,669  79,809  121,101 
Source: Based on figures from UNCTADStat Database, http://unctad.org/en/Pages/Statistics.aspx (viewed 14 July 2014). 
 
The negative impact is further amplified, thirdly, 
by the changing composition of traded goods. Russia 
imports growing volumes of manufactured goods 
from East Asia. Between 2000 and 2013, for example, 
the share of machinery and vehicles in Russian im-
ports from China grew from 8 to 40 percent, from 
Japan from 66 to 83 percent, from South Korea from 
26 to 73 percent and from the ASEAN countries from 
25 to 43 percent.119 Russia by contrast is able to sell 
ever fewer finished products in East Asia. During the 
same period the share of machinery and vehicles in 
Russian exports to China shrank from 11 to 3 percent, 
to South Korea from 11 percent to 2 percent, and to 
the South-East Asian states from 10 to 7 percent, while 
the share in exports to Japan remained negligible at 
1 percent. Even in semi-finished goods Russia lost mar-
ket share in East Asia. By 2013 sales of iron and steel 
to China, which still made up 17 percent of Russian 
exports to China in 2000, had almost completely dried 
up. The comparable figure for South Korea fell from 
13 and 3 percent and for ASEAN from 36 to 11 per-
119  UNCTADStat Database (viewed 14 July 2014). 
cent, while the figure for Japan again remained negli-
gible at 1 percent.120 
Energy and Arms: Ambivalently Competitive 
The very few areas where Russia is competitive in East 
Asia and has been able to position itself as a significant 
trading partner include first and foremost the energy 
and defence sectors.121 Because both are also strategi-
cally important, Moscow hopes not only to derive eco-
nomic profits from East Asian demand but also pros-
pectively to convert that into political influence. How-
ever, such concentration on exporting arms and energy 
involves economic and security risks for Russia. 
120  Based on figures from UNCTADStat Database, http:// 
unctad.org/en/Pages/Statistics.aspx (viewed 14 July 2014). 
121  Russia also cooperates with certain East Asian states 
in the space sector. 
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Energy Cooperation 
The energy hunger of the East Asian states is especially 
noticeable in oil and gas, but also includes electricity. 
In all three sectors Russia is an interesting partner: 
it supplies electricity to China and is building hydro-
electric and nuclear plants jointly with China, Viet-
nam and Laos.122 Cooperation is most advanced in the 
oil sector. Whereas Russia initially had to export oil 
by train or ship, eastward export potential has been 
expanded to 80 million tonnes/year by the completion 
of the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline.123 
A spur to the Chinese city of Daqing was completed 
in January 2011, while the main route to the Russian 
Pacific port of Kozmino, from where oil is shipped 
to Japan, South Korea, certain ASEAN states and the 
United States, followed in December 2012.124 Moscow 
has also expanded gas deliveries to East Asia, but more 
slowly and on a smaller scale than with oil. The only 
place in the Russian Far East where gas is extracted is 
the island of Sakhalin, since 2009 also the location of 
the only LNG plant in the east of the country, shipping 
10 million tonnes of liquefied natural gas (LNG) an-
122  A power transmission line from Russia’s Amur Oblast to 
Heilongjiang in China was completed in 2012. “China Com-
pletes Power Transmission Project with Russia”, Xinhua, 2 Jan-
uary 2012, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2012-01/02/content_ 
24309649.htm. The construction of two nuclear power plants 
and a research reactor has been agreed with Vietnam, and 
with Laos the building of a hydroelectric plant. “Vietnam 
Pushing Ahead with Nuclear Power Expansion”, Thanh Nien 
News, 11 November 2013, http://www.thanhniennews.com/ 
index/pages/20131107-vietnam-pushing-ahead-with-nuclear-
power-expansion.aspx; “Russian Firm Steps Up Dam Deal,” 
Radio Free Asia, 2 June 2013, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/ 
laos/hydropower-02062013151208.html. 
123  Under the agreement Russia will supply 15 million 
tonnes crude oil to Daqing annually for twenty years, starting 
in 2011. In March 2013 the two governments agreed to double 
the volume to 30 million tonnes between 2018 and 2030. The 
annual capacity of the ESPO section to Kozmino could poten-
tially be expanded from 30 to 50 million tonnes. Ewa Fischer, 
Completion of the ESPO Oil Pipeline Connects Siberia to the Pacific 
Ocean (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies [OSW], 9 January 
2013), http://www.osw.waw.pl/print/20310. 
124  30 percent of the oil supplied through ESPO goes to 
Japan, 29 percent to South Korea, 16 percent to the United 
States, 11 percent to Thailand, 8 percent to China, 3 percent 
to the Philippines, 2 percent to Singapore and 1 percent to 
Taiwan. Platts, Russian Crude Oil Exports to the Pacific Basin – 
An ESPO Update, February 2011, 2, http://www.platts.com/ 
im.platts.content/insightanalysis/industrysolutionpapers/ 
espo0211.pdf. 
nually above all to Japan and South Korea.125 China 
has to date been largely and notably absent as a Rus-
sian gas customer, because despite years of negotia-
tions the two sides were unable to agree on prices. 
That changed in May 2014, when Gazprom and China 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a 
thirty-year gas contract for 38 billion cubic metres/ 
year. In the wake of the Ukraine crisis Russia found 
itself forced to accept a lower price than it would have 
been able to achieve on the European market.126 
Although Russia has been able to expand its posi-
tion in East Asian energy markets, its share there is 
still small. In 2011/12 deliveries from Russia still 
accounted for just 8 percent of Chinese and 4 percent 
of Japanese oil imports and for 10 percent of Japanese 
and 8 percent of South Korean gas imports.127 In order 
to expand its market position, however, Russia would 
first have to invest heavily in the largely undeveloped 
oil and gas fields in the east of the country and build 
new pipelines, refineries and LNG plants. The invest-
ment requirement is vast in view of the difficult cli-
matic, geographical and socio-economic conditions, 
and practically insurmountable without foreign capi-
tal. That in turn would inevitably increase the nego-
tiating power of the potential East Asian financiers, 
first and foremost China and Japan, with respect to 
pricing and pipeline routing. It is also more urgent for 
Russia to increase its energy exports to East Asia than 
it is for the East Asian countries to source oil and gas 
125  Numerous plans exist for developing gas exports to East 
Asia: Japanese investment to build an LNG plant in Vladi-
vostok or supplying LNG from the Yamal Peninsula in north-
western Siberia to the Asian market. There is also discussion 
of an underwater pipeline to Japan and South Korea or an 
overland route from North to South Korea. Marcin Kaczmar-
ski, Activation of Russian Policy towards the Korean States (Warsaw: 
OSW, 9 November 2011), http://www.osw.waw.pl/print/20161; 
Szymon Kardaś, Russia Activates the LNG Sector (Warsaw: OSW, 
16 January 2013), http://www.osw.waw.pl/print/20313. 
126  The exact price has not been published. Experts estimate 
it will be about $350 per 1,000 cubic metres, well short of 
the $400 originally demanded by Moscow. As well as the Gaz-
prom/CNPC deal, a twenty-year agreement to supply three 
million tonnes of LNG annually from Yamal was also signed 
at the Sino-Russian Summit in Shanghai in May 2014. Witold 
Rodkiewicz, Putin in Shanghai: A Strategic Partnership on Chinese 
Terms (Warsaw: OSW, 21 May 2014), http://www.osw.waw.pl/ 
print/22174. 
127  US Energy Information Administration, “Japan”, 29 
October 2013, http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=JA; 
“South Korea”, 17 January 2012, http://www.eia.gov/countries/ 
cab.cfm?fips=KS; “China”, 22 April 2013, http://www.eia.gov/ 
countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH. Figures for ASEAN countries are 
not available. 
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from Russia on a grand scale. In view of falling 
demand for oil and gas in the European Union, as its 
main customer, Russia will be reliant on expanding 
its foothold in East Asia. The Russian Energy Strategy 
for 2030 foresees 22 to 25 percent of the country’s oil 
exports and 19 to 20 percent of its gas exports going 
to the Asia-Pacific region by 2030.128 And because the 
Russian state derives half its revenues from the energy 
sector, developing the East Asian markets is also 
politically crucial for the Kremlin. In contrast to the 
exporter, Russia, however, the importers China, Japan, 
South Korea and the ASEAN states have already success-
fully diversified their energy relationships.129 Other 
developments in the energy sector, such as the US 
fracking revolution, global exploitation of new (un)con-
ventional reserves and an LNG terminal construction 
boom, further exacerbate the competition. Russia will 
therefore remain only one of many suppliers, a situa-
tion that generates little in the way of economic in-
fluence, still less political. 
This was illustrated very clearly in connection with 
the nuclear meltdown at Fukushima. While the Krem-
lin was able to use the prospect of boosting oil and gas 
deliveries to revive the deadlocked political dialogue 
with Japan, it was not able to secure major Japanese 
investment in the eastern Russian regions. With respect 
to China there is even a risk that expanded energy 
cooperation could weaken rather than improve the 
Russian position. For example in 2008 Russia found 
itself compelled to agree a supply contract with China 
that involved conceding major concessions. The finan-
cial and economic crisis had embroiled Russia’s Trans-
neft and Rosneft in liquidity difficulties, and they 
were bailed out by the China Development Bank with 
loans of $25 billion. In return the ESPO spur from 
Skovorodino to Daqing was completed before the 
main route to Kozmino near Nakhodka on the Russian 
Pacific coast.130 Since the Skovorodino to Kozmino 
section opened in 2011 Beijing has been pushing to 
128  Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, Energy 
Strategy of Russia for the Period up to 2030 (Moscow, 2010), http:// 
www.energystrategy.ru/projects/docs/ES-2030_%28Eng%29.pdf. 
129  Elena Shadrina and Michael Bradshaw, “Russia’s Energy 
Governance Transitions and Implications for Enhanced Co-
operation with China, Japan, and South Korea”, Post-Soviet 
Affairs 29, no. 6 (2013): 461–99; Shoichi Itoh, Russia Looks East: 
Energy Markets and Geopolitics in Northeast Asia (Washington, 
D.C., 2011). 
130  Itoh, Russia Looks East (see note 129), 32; Linda Jakobson, 
Paul Holtom, Dean Knox and Jiangchao Peng, China’s Energy 
and Security Relations with Russia (Stockholm, October 2011), 26, 
39f. 
increase the capacity of the Daqing spur. In March 
2013 Rosneft agreed additional deliveries of 365 mil-
lion tonnes of oil over the coming twenty-five years.131 
Both of these developments endanger Russia’s energy 
export diversification strategy and strengthen Beijing’s 
hand as the main customer for Russian oil in East 
Asia. 
Expanding energy relations thus does little to 
further Russia’s regional ambitions in East Asia. On 
the contrary, it endangers the economic pillar of 
Russian ambitions more than supporting it. Russia is 
also cooperating with certain South-East Asian coun-
tries to develop and exploit their oil and gas reserves 
(Vietnam, Myanmar) and to build hydroelectric and 
nuclear power plant (Laos, Vietnam),132 and thus func-
tions as a modernisation partner for these countries 
in particular niches. But the bulk of Russian energy 
cooperation, above all with the financially strong 
economies of China, Japan and South Korea, consists 
in supplying raw materials. Between 2000 and 2012 
the share of oil and gas in Russian exports to South 
Korea grew from 12 to 69 percent, to China from 0 to 
67 percent, to Japan from 1 to 74 percent and to the 
ASEAN states from 38 to 61 percent.133 Russia is thus 
integrating itself into the regional economy of East 
Asia primarily as a raw material supplier. 
Arms Exports 
The defence industry is one of the rare high-tech sec-
tors where Russia remains competitive. For certain 
East Asian countries Russia has become an important 
defence modernisation partner. This applies especially 
to states that lack or have lacked alternative suppliers 
because of Western arms embargoes (such as China, 
Myanmar and Indonesia), and for countries worried 
about the growing regional power of China and the 
United States (such as Vietnam and Malaysia). East 
Asia has become an important market for Russia’s 
131  Stephen Blank, “Russia’s Energy Deals with East Asia: 
Who Wins?”, The Diplomat, 3 July 2013, http://thediplomat. 
com/2013/07/russias-energy-deals-with-east-asia-who-wins?/ 
allgap. 
132  “Russia’s Bashneft Wins Contract for Onshore Energy 
Block in Myanmar”, Reuters, 11 October 2013, http://de.reuters. 
com/article/idUKL6N0I11TC20131011; “Russian Firm Steps 
Up Dam Deal” (see note 122); Roberto Tofani, “Russia Rebuilds 
Ties with Vietnam”, Asia Times, 20 November 2013, http:// 
www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/SEA-02-201113.html. 
133  Based on figures from UNCTADStat Database. 
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arms manufacturers. With a share of 18 percent of 
Russian exports the region took second place in 2013 
behind India (47 percent) and thus ahead of the Middle 
East (12 percent) and the post-Soviet space (2 per-
cent).134 
Nonetheless, however, the prospects for turning 
defence industry cooperation into political influence 
are none too rosy. That said, particularly in South-East 
Asia arms exports have served as a door-opener to 
interest regional leaders in military cooperation with 
Russia, while formats for military staff exchanges and 
security dialogue have often originated in defence 
industry cooperation. When the territorial disputes in 
the South and East China Seas escalated, the political 
import of arms sales increased. In the eyes of certain 
South-East Asian states, this increased Russia’s attrac-
tiveness as a potential security partner for a hedging 
strategy. This was most noticeable in the relationship 
with Vietnam. The diplomatic upgrade to “compre-
hensive strategic partnership” in 2012 was preceded 
by major arms deals. But this did not generate direct 
Russian political influence. 
That applies all the more so to defence industry co-
operation with China, which has in fact come to have 
negative economic and security repercussions for 
Russia. Until 2005 Beijing was Moscow’s most impor-
tant arms buyer, taking up to 60 percent of all Russian 
arms exports.135 In the 1990s exports were vital for the 
survival of Russia’s defence industries, so Beijing was 
able to secure favourable conditions. Russia’s arms 
manufacturers not only supplied finished products 
but also involved Chinese partners in manufacturing 
through joint ventures and licensing. Together with 
product piracy this led to a massive technology trans-
fer to Russia’s detriment.136 China subsequently 
134  The figures relate to identified arms exports in 2013, of 
which Vietnam and China each received 9 percent. In terms 
of arms deals concluded in 2013, East Asia shared first place 
with India (26 percent each), well ahead of the Middle East 
(15 percent), Latin America (14 percent) and Africa (10 per-
cent). In terms of new contracts, Vietnam accounted for 18 
percent, Indonesia for 8 percent. Andrey Frolov, “Identified 
Russian Export Deliveries in 2013”, Moscow Defense Brief 34, 
no. 2 (2014): 14–21 (15, 17). 
135  Konstantin Makienko, “Russian Exports to China: What 
the Future Holds”, Moscow Defense Brief 18, no. 4 (2009).  
136  The most infamous incident of Chinese product piracy 
was the Russian Sukhoi Su-27 fighter, manufactured under 
licence in China in the 1990s and later marketed as the 
Chinese clone JB-11. Even if Beijing and Moscow signed an 
agreement on protection of intellectual property in 2008, 
anxieties over ongoing product piracy continue to weigh 
especially heavily on cooperation over state-of-the-art weap-
became a rival in the global arms market and was able 
to slash its import requirements. Since the second half 
of the 2000s China has only been interested in import-
ing niche products such as jet engines or state-of-the-
art weapons systems. Given that security concerns had 
previously led the Kremlin to refuse to sell the latest 
defence products to China, the March 2013 deal to 
supply twenty-four Sukhoi Su-35 fighters must be 
regarded as more a success for the Chinese than the 
Russians.137 Even in the 1990s Moscow was incapable 
of deriving political capital from Beijing’s then still 
significantly greater reliance on cooperation in the 
defence sector. Its future prospects will be even poorer. 
Moscow must now ensure that the security costs of 
defence industry cooperation do not outweigh the 
economic benefits. 
The Limits of Economic Integration 
If its economic role in East Asia is to extend beyond 
energy and arms, Russia will have to accomplish a 
twofold integration in the region. Firstly to tie its own 
eastern regions more closely to the adjacent economic 
space; secondly to ensure that it is not excluded from 
the region’s economic cooperation processes. Both can 
only succeed if Russia modernises economically, across 
the board and specifically in the Far East and in Siberia. 
Here the Kremlin hopes for support from East Asia. 
Russia’s Eastern Regions: 
Opportunity and Achilles’ Heel 
Having three quarters of its territory in Asia should 
theoretically be an advantage for Russia’s East Asian 
economic ambitions. The geography produces oppor-
tunities to expand cross-border trade with its North-
East Asian neighbours and to position Russia as a 
transport route connecting Asia and Europe by land 
or prospectively even by the Northern Sea Route. But 
the problematic socio-economic situation in Russia’s 
eastern regions means that these potentials cannot 
currently be fully exploited. Since the beginning of the 
1990s the eastern regions have lost about 25 percent 
ons systems. Jakobson, Holtom, Knox and Peng, China’s Energy 
and Security Relations with Russia (see note 130), 16, 21. 
137  “China Signs Arms-sales Deal with Russia”, United Press 
International, 25 March 2013, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/ 
World-News/2013/03/25/China-signs-arms-sales-deal-with-
Russia/UPI-29041364269020/. 
SWP-Berlin 
Russia: A Euro-Pacific Power? 
September 2014 
 
 
 
32 
 
 
The Limits of Economic Integration 
of their population and 90 percent of their heavy in-
dustry, while their already weak infrastructure has 
steadily deteriorated.138 
The Kremlin has been proclaiming the centrality 
of developing Siberia and the Far East since the second 
half of the 2000s, launching numerous development 
programmes and in 2012 even establishing a dedi-
cated Ministry for the Development of Russian Far 
East. But the measures and funds have turned out to 
be inadequate or been channelled above all into head-
line-grabbing prestige projects. For example Vladi-
vostok was spruced up to the tune of $21 billion for 
the APEC summit and received a new airport, three 
new major bridges and a new university. At the same 
time, infrastructure investment in the rest of the east-
ern regions remained woefully inadequate.139 
This increases the necessity to rely more heavily 
on foreign investment and cross-border economic co-
operation for developing the Far East and Siberia. 
Today Chinese firms are already investing more in 
Russia’s eastern regions than their Russian counter-
parts.140 Parts of the investment fund established in 
2013 with Japan and South Korea are to be used for 
joint projects in the Far East and in Siberia.141 Vladi-
mir Putin’s idea of an “Iron Silk Road”, connecting 
the Trans-Siberian Railway through to Busan in South 
Korean, has especially caught the eye of South Korean 
President Park Geun-Hye, who is pursuing her own 
“Eurasia Initiative”.142 Russia’s eastern regions have 
138  Kuhrt, “The Russian Far East in Russia’s Asia Policy?” 
(see note 12), 479; Rensselaer W. Lee, The Far East between 
Russia, China, and America (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Re-
search Institute, July 2012), http://www.fpri.org/print/247. 
139  “Vladivostok Holds Its Breath for Life after APEC”, Moscow 
Times, 5 September 2012, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/ 
business/article/vladivostok-holds-its-breath-for-life-after-
apec/467625.html. 
140  Andrew S. Bowen and Luke Rodeheffer, “Is Russia Losing 
Control of Its Far East?” The Diplomat, 1 October 2013, http:// 
thediplomat.com/2013/10/is-russia-losing-control-of-its-far-
east/. 
141  “South Korea and Russia Launch $500m Fund to Boost 
Economic Ties”, Financial Times, 13 November 2013; “Russia 
and Japan Create Joint Investment Pot with $1bn Entry 
Ticket”, Russia Today, 29 April 2013, http://rt.com/business/ 
russia-japan-investment-plans-576/. 
142  In September 2013 Russia completed the rail link from 
the Trans-Siberian to the ice-free North Korean port of Rajin, 
which is planned to serve as an export to Europe. A South 
Korean consortium wishes to participate. Sabine van Ameij-
den, “Peacemaker or Political Hostage? Prospects for the Mos-
cow-Busan ‘Iron Silk Road Express’”, Sino-NK, 11 November 
2013, http://sinonk.com/2013/11/11/peacemaker-or-political-
already aligned their external economic relations with 
East Asia. China is the most important economic part-
ner of the immediate border regions. Cross-border 
trade between the two countries has increased almost 
eightfold between 2000 and 2011 from $1.1 to $8.0 
billion.143 For the eastern regions bordering on North 
Korea rather than China, South Korea is the most im-
portant trading partner.144 
Yet the close economic integration of the Far East-
ern and Siberian regions with their North-East Asian 
neighbours has not to date yielded the expected 
modernisation effects. Especially in trade with China, 
economic structures disadvantageous to Russia tend to 
be perpetuated rather than overcome. This is demon-
strated by a glance at the cooperation programme 
agreed in 2009 between the eastern Russian and north-
eastern Chinese border regions. Of the projects plan-
ned for the Russian areas, 70 percent relate to joint 
development and exploitation of natural resources 
such as oil and timber, while 90 percent of the pro-
jects planned in the Chinese regions are industrial in 
nature.145 This contradicts the objectives formulated 
by the Russian leadership. In December 2013, Presi-
dent Putin called for the Far East to develop above all 
high-tech sectors such as space, biotech and robot-
ics.146 Some Russian experts see the concentration on 
utopian dreams as one cause of the lack of success to 
date, and demand that Russia restrict itself to more 
realistic goals such as developing the agricultural and 
forestry sectors. That way, they assert, Russia could fill 
a niche in the East Asian countries, whose demand 
for food is growing.147 As long as Russia cannot even 
secure investment in such processing industries and 
critical infrastructure projects, its eastern regions will 
remain its Achilles’ heel rather than offering oppor-
tunities for its East Asia ambitions. 
hostage-prospects-for-the-moscow-busan-iron-silk-road-
express/. 
143  Victor Larin, “Russia and China: New Trends in Bilateral 
Relations and Political Cooperation”, in From APEC 2011 to 
APEC 2012, ed. Azizian and Lukin (see note 57), 178–88 (182). 
144  Sergei Blagov, “Russia Mulls Far Eastern Economic 
Revival”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 9, no. 83 (2 May 2012). 
145  Lee, The Far East between Russia, China, and America (see 
note 138), 4. 
146  “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly”, Presi-
dent of Russia, official website, 12 December 2013, http://eng. 
kremlin.ru/news/6402. 
147  Karaganov, “Russia’s Asian Strategy” (see note 7). 
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Economic Integration: Russia Out on a Limb 
In order to be perceived as an important actor in 
East Asia, Russia would also have to participate more 
strongly in the economic cooperation processes occur-
ring there, in the sense of participating in the drafting 
and negotiation of bilateral and multilateral free trade 
agreements. In 2010 ASEAN signed free trade agree-
ments with China and South Korea. In November 2012 
ASEAN, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New 
Zealand and India agreed to begin talks to create the 
world’s largest free trade area (Regional Comprehen-
sive Economic Partnership, RCEP). At the same time, 
Washington is pushing on with its Trans-Pacific Part-
nership (TPP) with Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, 
New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam and possibly 
Japan, but excluding China. 
Participation in these processes would promote 
Russia’s economic integration in East Asia, because 
import duties would fall and foreign investment 
would become easier. But Russia remains largely an 
onlooker in these processes. Although it has signalled 
interest in a free trade agreement with ASEAN and 
a cooperation between RCEP and Russia’s customs 
union with Belarus and Kazakhstan,148 only with Viet-
nam have discussions about a free trade area actually 
been taking place, since December 2010. The proposed 
area would also include the other members of Russia’s 
customs union,149 demonstrating that the Kremlin is 
not interested only in concrete economic benefits but 
also in political prestige: Russia’s recognition as the 
leading power in the post-Soviet space. 
 
 
 
148  Tatyana Edovina, “Rossiia predloshit Azii tamozhennii 
soyuz” [Russia proposes customs union for Asia], Kommersant, 
20 November 2012. 
149  “Customs Union in Free Trade Zone Talks with Non-EU 
Europe – Lavrov”, RIA Novosti, 14 December 2013, http://en.ria. 
ru/russia/20131214/185550683.html. 
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Examination of the three dimensions of Russian East 
Asia policy reveals a mixed picture. To date Moscow 
has been unable to back its ambitions in the region 
with corresponding capacities. Although Russia main-
tains a large primarily nuclear deterrent, its capacity 
to project military power is too weak to make any 
significant contribution to regional security beyond 
its own borders. Moscow’s predilection for demonstra-
tions of military strength have more to do with the 
lack of alternatives than any success of this strategy. 
Politically Russia is neither in a position to influence 
the interaction of the East Asian states with one an-
other or with the United States nor to assist with the 
resolution of regional problems. Although Moscow 
has developed its own initiatives on the North Korea 
problem and resisted cooptation by Beijing over terri-
torial disputes, it lacks the political strength to lend 
weight to its demands or to fill a mediating role. The 
most fragile pillar of its Euro-Pacific ambitions is the 
economic. With the exception of energy and arms 
Russia’s economy is largely uncompetitive, and not 
even cooperation in those two strategically important 
areas has expanded Moscow’s political influence. 
The power fixation of Russian East Asia policy often 
leads Moscow to seek gains in status over substance. 
This is confirmed by its actions in certain regional 
organisations and its policy towards Siberia and the 
Far East. Instead of investing in a sustainable mod-
ernisation of the eastern regions, scarce resources are 
channelled into prestigious events such as the APEC 
summit in Vladivostok. 
The emergence of a coherent East Asia strategy is 
also hindered by a Russian leadership that still thinks 
too little in regional terms. This is particularly notice-
able in its relationships with China and the United 
States, both of which Moscow continues to perceive 
from a traditional global perspective. Although Mos-
cow regards Beijing as a valuable partner with which 
to counterbalance Washington, it appears predestined 
to become the junior partner in its “strategic partner-
ship” with China in East Asia, which yields it little 
benefit. As long as the Kremlin fails to develop ideas 
about how to involve the United States in its East Asia 
policy, its plans for diversification or a role as “swing 
state” will remain unfulfilled. 
Even if Russia is still a long way from becoming a 
central actor in East Asia, it has been developing the 
eastern pillar of its foreign policy in earnest since the 
mid-2000s – for the first time. A comparison with the 
1990s demonstrates the progress made. Whereas at 
that time Russia’s East Asia policy exhausted itself in 
a “strategic partnership” with China, it has since been 
able to expand its relations with all countries in the 
region, albeit to different degrees. In South-East Asia 
Moscow has succeeded above all in consolidating its 
relationships with Vietnam and ASEAN; success in 
joining all the major regional institutions is a direct 
outcome of this policy. As far as North-East Asia is 
concerned, the rapprochement with Japan stands out, 
revealing President Putin’s more strongly strategic 
thinking in relation to East Asia. At least in the diplo-
matic sphere the foundations have been laid for a 
larger Russian role in East Asia. 
What are the consequences of Moscow’s new East 
Asia policy for Germany and Europe? Few in the Rus-
sian discourse call for a fundamental reorientation to 
East Asia in the sense of a turn away from the Euro-
Atlantic space, still less a balancing. But the proposal 
to expand political and economic relations with the 
East Asian states and institutions was from outset 
based on the intention to relativise a hitherto Euro-
centric foreign policy. The European Union and Rus-
sian-European relations had, as many Russian experts 
and politicians say, reached their limits. The theory 
of the decline of Europe is widespread in the Russian 
debate: here the European Union with its internal 
problems, there East Asia as the icon of dynamic 
growth. If Russia wants to be on the winning side, 
many Russian experts and politicians assert, it must 
look more strongly eastward.150 The turn to the east 
is also justified by the crisis in Russian-European 
relations: stagnating growth rates in foreign trade, 
crucial security regimes like conventional arms con-
trol deadlocked and the political relationship steadily 
deteriorating. Criticisms of the domestic situation 
in Russia and of the Kremlin’s influence in the post-
Soviet space in general and Ukraine policy in particu-
150  Bobo Lo, Russia’s Eastern Direction – Distinguishing the Real 
from the Virtual (Paris, January 2014), 10. 
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lar leave, they say, little room for an expansion of rela-
tions with Europe. By contrast, the East Asian actors 
represent an untapped “reserve”.151 Altogether the 
orientation towards East Asia is seen as the realisation 
of a demand that has been a mantra of the foreign 
policy debate since the 1990s: Moscow must pursue 
a multi-vectoral foreign policy. 
Even if a new East Asia policy makes Russia’s for-
eign policy less Eurocentric, the pillars of its putative 
multi-vectoral foreign policy will continue to differ in 
strength in the short to medium term. Moscow will 
therefore be in no position to play the East Asia card 
against Europe. Economically the states of the Euro-
pean Union remain Russia’s most important moderni-
sation and trade partners. Politically Moscow’s posi-
tion in Europe is stronger, the depth and breadth of 
its relationships with the EU member-states and the 
European Union firmer than with East Asia. Nor can 
the close cultural, historic and social ties with the 
rest of Europe be substituted by any equivalent in East 
Asia. Possible restrictions of political, military and 
economic contacts triggered by the Ukraine crisis do 
nothing to fundamentally change that. Interestingly, 
identity issues play virtually no role in the Russian 
East Asia discourse. The concept of the “Euro-Pacific 
power” assumes that Russia is historically and cul-
turally an inseparable part of Europe and that the 
turn to the east springs in the first place from prag-
matic interest-driven politics. 
In economic, security and political terms, Russia 
and the European Union have in the past largely 
ignored each other’s East Asia policy. Although Russia 
considers the European states as possible investors in 
the Far East and Siberia, the European Union is scarce-
ly noticed as a political actor in East Asia. 
In its guidelines on foreign and security policy in 
East Asia of June 2012 the European Union similarly 
defines Russia as an “extra-regional” actor with which 
it would like to conduct a political dialogue on East 
Asia.152 There is in fact a sectoral dialogue format, 
under which representatives of the Russian foreign 
ministry and the European External Action Service 
151  Valdai Club, “Russian-Chinese Section of the Valdai Club 
Discussed Russia’s Strategy in Asia”, 4 December 2011, http:// 
valdaiclub.com/event/33780.html. 
152  Council of the European Union, Guidelines on the EU’s 
Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia (Brussels, 15 June 2012), 8, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/asia/docs/guidelines_eu_foreign_sec_ 
pol_east_asia_en.pdf. 
meet twice a year.153 But the political exchange is 
still in its infancy. 
In view of troubled relations in the wake of the 
Ukraine crisis, the European Union and Russia are 
unlikely to intensify their exchange on East Asia in 
the short term. If the Russian-European relationship 
relaxes, however, that would make sense in the 
medium term. 
The first priority would be to define fields of shared 
interest in the first place. Starting points for this can 
be found at a general level. Both sides are interested 
in containing the rise of China and its growing rivalry 
with the United States with the help of multilateral 
institutions. The establishment of a functioning region-
al security and cooperation architecture is therefore 
a shared interest for Moscow and Brussels. Both can 
draw on shared experiences, for example confidence-
building measures, the OSCE or the NATO-Russia 
Council. 
Peaceful resolution of the North Korea problem and 
the territorial disputes in the East and South China 
Seas would also be in the mutual interest of Moscow 
and Brussels. The Russian approach of using economic 
incentives to encourage a thaw between North and 
South Korea possesses certain potential, even if it will 
not be able to be realised in the near future. Brussels 
in turn must be interested in avoiding Russia’s decline 
to become China’s political and economic junior part-
ner. In economic respects it is relevant for Europe to 
develop Russia as an east-west transport corridor. 
Building on such a dialogue, joint initiatives could 
be developed and practical cooperations staged. In the 
longer run this might eventually represent a possibil-
ity to introduce a new positive agenda to counter in-
creasingly tense relations in the Euro-Atlantic and 
post-Soviet spaces. But the chances of such a venture 
should not be overestimated. As long as Russia and the 
European Union are only political marginalia in East 
Asia and their mutual relations are troubled, both the 
incentives for cooperation and the rewards thereof 
will be small. 
153  European Strategic Partnerships Observatory, “Dia-
logues”, http://strategicpartnerships.eu/pays/eu-russia/. 
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Abbreviations 
Abbreviations 
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
ASEM Asia-Europe Meeting 
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 
CNPC China National Petroleum Corporation 
CSCAP Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific 
ESPO Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (pipeline) 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas 
MGIMO Moskovskii Gosudarstvennii Institut 
Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii (Moscow State 
Institute of International Relations) 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
OSW Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich (Centre for Eastern 
Studies, Warsaw) 
PONARS Program on New Approaches to Russian Security 
RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
RIMPAC Rim of the Pacific 
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development 
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